Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 174 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.
Reply Obj. 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt. 6:16) that ”they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast.” Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is ”the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves”: and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.
Reply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, ”There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,”
and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, ”speaks low” wickedly.
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QUESTION 114
OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (In Two Articles)
We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a special virtue?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 1]
Whether Friendliness Is a Special Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that ”the perfect friends.h.i.+p is that which is on account of virtue.” Now any virtue is the cause of friends.h.i.+p: ”since the good is lovable to all,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he ”takes everything in a right manner both from those he loves and from those who are not his friends.” Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friends.h.i.+p to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, virtue ”observes the mean according as a wise man decides” (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): ”The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth”: wherefore ”it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure” (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friends.h.i.+p, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), ”is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain.” Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.
Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): ”Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor.” Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friends.h.i.+p, is a special virtue.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friends.h.i.+p in his _Ethics._ One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity (Q. 23, A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what things belong to this kind of friends.h.i.+p. But he mentions another friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friends.h.i.+p, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact.
Reply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that ”every beast loveth its like.” This love is signified by signs of friends.h.i.+p, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not show them signs of perfect friends.h.i.+p, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friends.h.i.+p.
Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that ”the heart of the wise is where there is mourning” it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): ”If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity”: but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. 7:38, ”Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.” Again, ”the heart of fools is where there is mirth,” not that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not l.u.s.tful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, ”Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.”
Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): ”Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,” and further on (2 Cor. 7:9), ”I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto repentance.” For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26): ”Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them.”
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 2]
Whether This Kind of Friends.h.i.+p Is a Part of Justice?
Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friends.h.i.+p is not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellows.h.i.+p. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3).