Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 178 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh.
As a consequence, however, it is a sin against G.o.d, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things.
Reply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 2]
Whether Covetousness Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): ”Covetousness, which in Greek is called _philargyria_, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately.” Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a general sin.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), ”the covetous (_avarus_) man” is so called because he is ”greedy for bra.s.s (_avidus aeris_),” i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called _philargyria_, i.e. ”love of silver.” Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.
Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, ”For I had not known concupiscence,” says: ”The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.” Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Ex. 20:17): ”Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods.” Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.
_On the contrary,_ Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: ”Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness” [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.
_I answer that,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appet.i.te tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.
Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated.
Since, however, the verb ”to have,” which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De Praedicamentis_), consequently the term ”covetousness” has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that ”covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after.” In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the pa.s.sage quoted in the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term ”money,” inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special vice.
Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 3]
Whether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality?
Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, ”Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality.
Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:9): ”A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them.” Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.
_I answer that,_ Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): ”Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood ... and to run after gains through covetousness.”
Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6).
In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): ”That they would ... prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness,” where a gloss observes: ”Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little.”
Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality [*_aneleutheria_] by the Philosopher.
Reply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, princ.i.p.ally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.