Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 180 (2/2)

Obj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circ.u.mstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circ.u.mstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circ.u.mstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov. 21:20): ”There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that ”it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing.” Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that ”the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man.”

_I answer that,_ Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): ”A man to whom G.o.d hath given riches ... yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof.”

Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.

Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.

Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.

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QUESTION 120

OF ”EPIKEIA” OR EQUITY (In Two Articles)

We must now consider ”epikeia,” under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ”epikeia” is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of justice?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 1]

Whether ”Epikeia” [*_Epieikeia_] Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet _epikeia_ does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. x.x.xi): ”With regard to these earthly laws, although men pa.s.s judgment on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must p.r.o.nounce judgment not on them but according to them.” But seemingly _epikeia_ p.r.o.nounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case.

Therefore _epikeia_ is a vice rather than a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to _epikeia_ to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).

But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the _Codex of Laws and Const.i.tutions,_ under _Law_ i: ”It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret between equity and law.” Therefore the act of _epikeia_ is unlawful: and consequently _epikeia_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious--for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of _epikeia_ which we call equity.

Therefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ does not set aside that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the _Codex of Laws and Const.i.tutions_ under _Law_ v: ”Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver.”

Reply Obj. 2: It would be pa.s.sing judgment on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be observed in some particular case is pa.s.sing judgment not on the law, but on some particular contingency.

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