Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 193 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 1: Fort.i.tude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the pa.s.sion. Wherefore security is not the same as fort.i.tude, but is a condition thereof.
Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fort.i.tude and of magnanimity.
Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and partic.i.p.ation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.
3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8]
Whether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity?
Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): ”virtue suffices for itself.” Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: ”Magnanimity consists of two things,” that ”a great soul is commended for despising external things.” Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.
Obj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that ”it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man.” And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that ”a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune.” Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.
Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that ”good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things.
For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the mult.i.tude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.
Reply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.
Reply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.
Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
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QUESTION 130
OF PRESUMPTION (In Two Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether presumption is a sin?
(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 1]
Whether Presumption Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: ”Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: 'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before.” But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) ”we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal”: and (Metaph. i) ”that man should pursue divine things as far as possible.” Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.
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