Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 198 (1/2)
Obj. 2: Further, ”every magnificent man is liberal” (Ethic. iv, 2).
But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.
Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since ”the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves,” as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that ”magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale.” Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that ”a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,”
i.e. proportionate, ”expenditure.” Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.
Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 4]
Whether Magnificence Is a Part of Fort.i.tude?
Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fort.i.tude.
For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above (A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fort.i.tude, but of justice.
Therefore magnificence is not a part of fort.i.tude.
Obj. 2: Further, fort.i.tude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fort.i.tude.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that ”the magnificent man is like the man of science.” Now science has more in common with prudence than with fort.i.tude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fort.i.tude.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fort.i.tude.
_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fort.i.tude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to princ.i.p.al virtue.
In order for a virtue to be annexed to a princ.i.p.al virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the princ.i.p.al, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fort.i.tude in the point that as fort.i.tude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fort.i.tude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fort.i.tude, in that the arduous thing to which fort.i.tude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fort.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the pa.s.sions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.
Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fort.i.tude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fort.i.tude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.
Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand.
This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.
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QUESTION 135