Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 199 (2/2)
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom.
x.x.xv in Evang.) ”patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.” Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.
_On the contrary,_ It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call princ.i.p.al.
_I answer that,_ Virtues by their very nature are directed to good.
For it is virtue that ”makes its possessor good, and renders the latter's work good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly.
Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fort.i.tude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hards.h.i.+p, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fort.i.tude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.
Reply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hards.h.i.+ps: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.
Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.
Reply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed owners.h.i.+p; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the pa.s.sions that are evoked by hards.h.i.+ps and disturb the soul.
Reply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 3]
Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?
Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that ”men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully.” Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.
Obj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hards.h.i.+ps rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.
Obj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health.
Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 61:6): ”From Him,” i.e. from G.o.d, ”is my patience.”
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), ”the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure.” The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end.
Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves G.o.d above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, ”Charity is patient.”
But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, ”The charity of G.o.d is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.” Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.
Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more p.r.o.ne to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.
Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of G.o.d's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 4]
Whether Patience Is a Part of Fort.i.tude?
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