Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 206 (1/2)
_On the contrary,_ Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.
_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.
It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and s.e.x; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.
Reply Obj. 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q.
84, AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplis.h.i.+ng the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation.
Reply Obj. 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 2]
Whether Intemperance Is a Childish Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin.
For Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, ”Unless you be converted, and become as little children,” says that ”a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,” all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
Obj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now ”in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
Obj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5, ”Mortify ... your members upon the earth, which are ...
concupiscence” [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth, fornication . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that ”we apply the term intemperance* to childish faults.” [*_Akolasia_ which Aristotle refers to _kolazo_ to punish, so that its original sense would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.
First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense.
Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason.
Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading ”Comeliness is twofold,” that ”the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals.”
Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like manner ”concupiscence does not listen to reason,” according to _Ethic._ vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): ”A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong.” So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): ”l.u.s.t served became a custom, and custom not resisted became necessity.” Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13, 14): ”Withhold not correction from a child ... Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from h.e.l.l.” In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed ”thereon, the impulse of custom,” i.e.
carnal concupiscence, ”is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it.” Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that ”as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord with reason.”
Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term ”childish” as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and s.e.x, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to quant.i.ty. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).
There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above.
Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 3]
Whether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance?
[*Cf. Q. 125]
Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fort.i.tude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141, A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.