Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 217 (1/2)

(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?

(4) Of its relation to purity.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 1]

Whether Chast.i.ty Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that chast.i.ty is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chast.i.ty, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body.

Therefore chast.i.ty is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is ”a voluntary habit,” as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But chast.i.ty, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chast.i.ty is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chast.i.ty is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chast.i.ty is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chast.i.ty is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de Tempore]): ”Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chast.i.ty is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of l.u.s.t, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious.”

_I answer that,_ Chast.i.ty takes its name from the fact that reason ”chastises” concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chast.i.ty is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Chast.i.ty does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chast.i.ty that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), ”so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not even the violence of another's l.u.s.t can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency.” He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that ”in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fort.i.tude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil.”

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), ”it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by faith.” Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chast.i.ty, nor any other virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) ”virtues are distinguished from vices not by their functions,” i.e. their acts, ”but by their ends.”

Reply Obj. 4: Chast.i.ty is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 2]

Whether Chast.i.ty Is a General Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that chast.i.ty is a general virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that ”chast.i.ty of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things.” But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chast.i.ty is a general virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, ”Chast.i.ty” takes its name from ”chastis.e.m.e.nt” [*Cf.

A. 1]. Now every movement of the appet.i.tive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appet.i.te, it seems that every moral virtue is chast.i.ty.

Obj. 3: Further, chast.i.ty is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27): ”Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee.” Therefore chast.i.ty is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ The word ”chast.i.ty” is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word ”chast.i.ty” is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chast.i.ty and of l.u.s.t its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chast.i.ty metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely G.o.d, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by G.o.d, this may be called a spiritual chast.i.ty, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, ”I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ.” If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer.

3:1, ”But thou hast prost.i.tuted thyself to many lovers.” Taking chast.i.ty in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chast.i.ty consists princ.i.p.ally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes chast.i.ty in the metaphorical sense.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 142, A. 2), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.

Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chast.i.ty is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as fort.i.tude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.