Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 220 (1/2)

Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin.

For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): ”I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.”

Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.

Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by ”excess” and ”deficiency”

as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that ”it is incompatible with the act of understanding,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.

Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): ”This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment”: and he refers to the act of s.e.xual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.

_I answer that,_ A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): ”What food is to a man's well being, such is s.e.xual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race.” Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.

First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way s.e.xual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.

viii): ”Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of G.o.d: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal chast.i.ty, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary.”

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A.

2), the mean of virtue depends not on quant.i.ty but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appet.i.te is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against G.o.d, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), ”the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin.”

Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 3]

Whether the l.u.s.t That Is About Venereal Acts Can Be a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that l.u.s.t about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of s.e.m.e.n which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim.

i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

Obj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently l.u.s.t is no sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to l.u.s.t. Therefore l.u.s.t is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of l.u.s.t, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 5:18), ”Be not drunk with wine wherein is l.u.s.t [Douay: 'luxury'].” Therefore l.u.s.t is forbidden.

Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay: 'luxury'].

_I answer that,_ The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race.

Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now l.u.s.t consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt l.u.s.t is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener.

Anim. i, 18), ”the s.e.m.e.n is a surplus that is needed.” For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of s.e.m.e.n, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against l.u.s.t, ”You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear G.o.d in your body.” Wherefore by inordinately using the body through l.u.s.t a man wrongs G.o.d Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): ”G.o.d Who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be.”

Reply Obj. 3: The opposite of l.u.s.t is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for s.e.xual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.