Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 228 (1/2)
Obj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt. 5:4) among the beat.i.tudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beat.i.tudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): ”Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness.” Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since ”virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also” (Ethic. ii, 6).
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.
_I answer that,_ The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appet.i.te to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, ”is guided by reason,” according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.
Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external punis.h.i.+ng, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite.
Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), ”the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness.” For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since ”scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself,” as Sall.u.s.t observes [*Cf. Q. 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): ”Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon.” Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_ [*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad 1).
Reply Obj. 3: The beat.i.tudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beat.i.tude and fruit.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 3]
Whether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A.
2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): ”A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty.” Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.
_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that ”clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.”
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.
_I answer that,_ Parts are a.s.signed to the princ.i.p.al virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of fort.i.tude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a certain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as princ.i.p.al virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.
Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that ”it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that ”clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul”; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.
Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to princ.i.p.al virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in matter.
Reply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appet.i.tive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby ”every man is naturally friendly towards all other men” (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 4]
Whether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of G.o.d.
Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of G.o.d: for it is written (James 1:21): ”With meekness receive the ingrafted word,” and (Ecclus. 5:13): ”Be meek to hear the word” of G.o.d. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that ”Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness.” Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to G.o.d and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to G.o.d. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34, 35): ”That which is agreeable” to G.o.d is ”faith and meekness”; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt. 11:29), where He says: ”Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart”; and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that ”Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.” Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): ”My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men”: for which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's ”throne is strengthened by clemency.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.