Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 233 (1/2)
Whether One Ought, by Humility, to Subject Oneself to All Men?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to G.o.d. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to G.o.d, as is the case with all acts of religious wors.h.i.+p. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia x.x.xiv): ”Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood.” Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men.
Obj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): ”Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority.” Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:3): ”In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves.”
_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in man, namely that which is G.o.d's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is man's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is G.o.d's, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, ”Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” Now humility, as stated above (A.
1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to G.o.d. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of G.o.d's: but humility does not require a man to subject what he has of G.o.d's to that which may seem to be G.o.d's in another. For those who have a share of G.o.d's gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: ”That we may know the things that are given us from G.o.d.” Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from G.o.d above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph.
3:5): ”(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles.” In like manner, humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): ”We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.” Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to him with humility.
Reply Obj. 1: We must not only revere G.o.d in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere G.o.d. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for G.o.d's sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13, ”Be ye subject ... to every human creature for G.o.d's sake”; but to G.o.d alone do we owe the wors.h.i.+p of latria.
Reply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of G.o.d's above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, ”Esteem others better than themselves,” says: ”We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden.”
Reply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): ”With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of G.o.d.” On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4]
Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to G.o.d, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have G.o.d for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.
Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fort.i.tude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).
Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.
_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): ”If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which G.o.d regards is the same as what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation.” Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2), in a.s.signing parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a pa.s.sion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but ”temperate,” and such a man we may call humble.
Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): ”In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit.”
Reply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appet.i.te, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for G.o.d does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.
Reply Obj. 2: Parts are a.s.signed to a princ.i.p.al virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is a.s.signed as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.
Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fort.i.tude, and humility a part of temperance.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 5]
Whether Humility Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican (Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that ”if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of G.o.d.” Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C.