Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 251 (2/2)

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): ”I know a man in Christ ... rapt even to the third heaven.” On which words a gloss says: ”Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature.”

_I answer that,_ Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (Obj. 3); and ”the violent is that which has its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all” (Ethic.

iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural.

Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination--for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending--for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.

Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards the term of transport--as when it is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, ”Lest He s.n.a.t.c.h you away, and there be none to deliver you”; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.

This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power of G.o.d. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of G.o.d to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, ”The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of G.o.d into Jerusalem.”

It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose.

But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, ”The invisible things of G.o.d ... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to G.o.d's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpa.s.ses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine a.s.sistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind be thus uplifted in rapture by G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 2]

Whether Rapture Pertains to the Cognitive Rather Than to the Appet.i.tive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appet.i.tive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv): ”The Divine love causes ecstasy.” Now love pertains to the appet.i.tive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that ”he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself.” Now the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appet.i.te. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the appet.i.te that is affected.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, ”In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded,” says in explaining the t.i.tle [*Unto the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: ”_Ekstasis_ in Greek signifies in Latin _excessus mentis,_ an aberration of the mind. This happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower world.” Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appet.i.te.

Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appet.i.te.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 115:2, ”I said in my excess: Every man is a liar,” says: ”We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation.” Now revelation pertains to the intellective power.

Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.

_I answer that,_ We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appet.i.tive, but only to the cognitive power.

For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appet.i.tive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.

Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appet.i.tive power. For from the very fact that the appet.i.te is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appet.i.tive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only ”to the third heaven”--which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect--but also into ”paradise,” which pertains to the appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper order [*Cf. I-II, Q. 28, A. 3]; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appet.i.tive power, as when a man's appet.i.te tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that ”the Divine love causes ecstasy,” inasmuch as it makes man's appet.i.te tend to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that ”even G.o.d Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings.” But even if this were said expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture.

Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appet.i.te in man; to wit, the intellective appet.i.te which is called the will, and the sensitive appet.i.te known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appet.i.te be subject to the higher appet.i.te, and that the higher move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appet.i.te, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appet.i.te tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appet.i.te inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that ”Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love” exclaimed: ”I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.”

In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appet.i.te, and takes no account of his higher appet.i.te. It is thus that ”he who fed the swine debased himself”; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appet.i.te is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appet.i.te a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appet.i.te, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the pa.s.sion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the pa.s.sion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.

It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the appet.i.te may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.

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