Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 7 (1/2)
_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2, 4), a.s.sumption implies two things, viz. the act of the one a.s.suming and the term of the a.s.sumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them.
Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have a.s.sumed flesh even as the Son.
Reply Obj. 1: The temporal sons.h.i.+p, whereby Christ is said to be the Son of Man, does not const.i.tute His Person, as does the eternal Sons.h.i.+p; but is something following upon the temporal nativity.
Hence, if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.
Reply Obj. 2: Adoptive sons.h.i.+p is a certain partic.i.p.ation of natural sons.h.i.+p; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father, Who is the principle of natural sons.h.i.+p, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6: ”G.o.d hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father.” And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we receive adoptive sons.h.i.+p in the likeness of His natural sons.h.i.+p, so likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received adoptive sons.h.i.+p from Him, as from the principle of the natural sons.h.i.+p, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and Son.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of G.o.d is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the nature of mission.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 6]
Whether Several Divine Persons Can a.s.sume One and the Same Individual Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot a.s.sume one and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in several Persons does not make several G.o.ds, so one human nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be only one man, for one man is ”this man,” which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can take one human nature.
Obj. 2: Further, the a.s.sumption is terminated in the unity of Person, as has been said above (A. 2). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot a.s.sume one human nature.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3, 4), and Augustine (De Trin. i, 11, 12, 13), that from the Incarnation of G.o.d the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of G.o.d is said of the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to a.s.sume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons.
Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of G.o.d; and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should a.s.sume one human nature.
_On the contrary,_ The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be a.s.sumed by the three Persons.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 2, A. 5, ad 1), by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human nature is a.s.sumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation ”the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer,” as Augustine says (Ep.
ad Volusianum cx.x.xvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine Person a.s.suming, and not according to the quality of the human nature a.s.sumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine Persons should a.s.sume one human nature, but it would be impossible for them to a.s.sume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus h.o.m.o ii, 9), that ”several Persons cannot a.s.sume one and the same man to unity of Person.”
Reply Obj. 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons a.s.sume one human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three Persons are one G.o.d on account of the one Divine Nature, so it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. Nor would ”one” imply unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): ”The Spirit of G.o.d and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results,” according to 1 Cor. 6:17: ”He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.”
Reply Obj. 2: In this supposition the human nature would be a.s.sumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each Person by a.s.sumption.
Reply Obj. 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.
But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain.
Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as ”man” stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on to say, ”The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten,” it would be the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say G.o.d is unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is G.o.d.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 7]
Whether One Divine Person Can a.s.sume Two Human Natures?
Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot a.s.sume two human natures. For the nature a.s.sumed in the mystery of the Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is plain from what has been stated above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6).
Therefore, if we suppose one Person to a.s.sume two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita.
Obj. 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible.
Obj. 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature a.s.sumed, i.e. to every part of it, for Christ is ”perfect G.o.d and perfect man, complete G.o.d and complete man,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possibly for one Divine Person to a.s.sume two human natures.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still a.s.sume a human nature distinct from that which the Son has a.s.sumed; for in nothing is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can a.s.sume another human nature distinct from the one He has a.s.sumed.