Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 27 (1/2)
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 5, ad 3), by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appet.i.te, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q.
35, AA. 2, 7), as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ's soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His pa.s.sion and death--or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated (A. 4), when we were speaking of the pa.s.sions of Christ's soul in general.
Reply Obj. 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect pa.s.sion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a ”propa.s.sion.” Hence it is written (Matt.
26:37): ”He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad.” For ”it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful,” as Jerome says, on this text.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), ”for the three pa.s.sions”--desire, joy, and fear--the Stoics held three _eupatheias_ i.e. good pa.s.sions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire, will--for joy, delight--for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although what is virtuous is man's chief good, and what is sinful is man's chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appet.i.te by his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that ”whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad,” because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propa.s.sion, and not a pa.s.sion.
Reply Obj. 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): ”Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious pa.s.sions?”
Reply Obj. 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's death and pa.s.sion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 7]
Whether There Was Fear in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is written (Prov. 28:1): ”The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.” But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): ”I ask those who think thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the glory of martyrdom?” Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid.
Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus ”began to fear and to be heavy.”
_I answer that,_ As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil.
Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appet.i.te naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow.
Secondly, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).
Reply Obj. 1: The just man is said to be ”without dread,” in so far as dread implies a perfect pa.s.sion drawing man from what reason dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propa.s.sion.
Hence it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus ”began to fear and to be heavy,” with a propa.s.sion, as Jerome expounds (Matt. 26:37).
Reply Obj. 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow, i.e. as regards the necessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily a.s.sumed fear, even as sorrow.
Reply Obj. 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils by the power of His G.o.dhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 15, Art. 8]
Whether There Was Wonder in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said (A.
3). Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that ”wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great”; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the ”magnanimous man does not wonder.” But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at nothing.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 8:10): ”Jesus hearing this,”
i.e. the words of the centurion, ”marveled.”