Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 30 (1/2)

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:14): ”The Word was made flesh”: and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), ”when he said, 'The Word was made flesh,' it is as if it were said that G.o.d was made man.”

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of G.o.d, as stated above (A. 1), yet in such sort that it pertains to G.o.d to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His a.s.suming human nature. Hence, this is true, ”G.o.d was made man”; though it is understood differently by some: even as this, ”G.o.d is man,” as we said above (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But G.o.d is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And hence for G.o.d to be made man does not mean that G.o.d was made simply.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, to be made implies that something is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of G.o.d: ”Lord, Thou art made [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge” (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to G.o.d by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of G.o.d without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is a.s.sumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, ”G.o.d was made man,” we understand no change on the part of G.o.d, but only on the part of the human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of G.o.d, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, ”G.o.d was made the Person of the Son of G.o.d,” yet this is true: ”G.o.d was made man” by being united to human nature.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 7]

Whether This Is True: ”Man Was Made G.o.d”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: ”Man was made G.o.d.” For it is written (Rom. 1:2, 3): ”Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh.” Now Christ, as man, is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that ”such was this a.s.sumption, which made G.o.d man, and man G.o.d.” But by reason of this a.s.sumption this is true: ”G.o.d was made man.” Therefore, in like manner, this is true: ”Man was made G.o.d.”

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory n.a.z.ianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): ”G.o.d was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it.” Now G.o.d is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made G.o.d; and thus it is true that ”Man was made G.o.d.”

Obj. 4: Further, when it is said that ”G.o.d was made man,” the subject of the making or uniting is not G.o.d, but human nature, which the word ”man” signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to which the making is attributed. Hence ”Man was made G.o.d” is truer than ”G.o.d was made man.”

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): ”We do not say that man was deified, but that G.o.d was humanized.” Now to be made G.o.d is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: ”Man was made G.o.d.”

_I answer that,_ This proposition, Man was made G.o.d, may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle ”made”

absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is G.o.d made, as will be said (AA. 8, 9). And in the same sense this is false: ”G.o.d was made man.” But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word ”made” determines the composition, with this meaning: ”Man was made G.o.d, i.e. it was brought about that Man is G.o.d.” And in this sense both are true, viz. that ”Man was made G.o.d”

and that ”G.o.d was made Man.” But this is not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that ”man” has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although ”this man” was not made G.o.d, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of G.o.d, was eternally G.o.d, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always G.o.d. Thirdly, properly understood, this participle ”made” attaches making to man with relation to G.o.d, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of G.o.d and Man, as was shown (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3), this proposition is false, because, when it is said, ”Man was made G.o.d,” ”man” has a personal suppositum: because, to be G.o.d is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom ”to be G.o.d” is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of G.o.d, Who was always G.o.d. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be G.o.d, or is made G.o.d, or that He was made G.o.d.

But if there were a different hypostasis of G.o.d and man, so that ”to be G.o.d” was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made G.o.d, i.e. joined to G.o.d, and that G.o.d was made Man, i.e. joined to man.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative ”Who” which refers to the Person of the Son of G.o.d ought not to be considered as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the ”seed of David according to the flesh” was made the Son of G.o.d--and it is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning--that the ”Son of G.o.d was made to Him ('namely to the honor of the Father,' as a gloss expounds it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh,” as if to say ”the Son of G.o.d having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of G.o.d.”

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the a.s.sumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is G.o.d and G.o.d is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true as stated above.

The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is the same as to be made G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially, i.e.

for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally, i.e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that ”Man was made G.o.d,” the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is G.o.d from eternity, and hence it does not befit Him to be made G.o.d. But when it is said that ”G.o.d was made Man,” the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true: ”G.o.d was made Man,” and this is false: ”Man was made G.o.d”; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: ”This man was made white today,” and this would be false; ”This white thing was made man today.” Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making, e.g. if it were said that ”human nature was made the Son of G.o.d's.”

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 8]

Whether This Is True: ”Christ Is a Creature”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: ”Christ is a creature.”

For Pope Leo says [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. xii de Nativ.]: ”A new and unheard of covenant: G.o.d Who is and was, is made a creature.” Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of G.o.d became by the Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ is a creature.

Obj. 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated of the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated above (A. 5). But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator.

Obj. 3: Further, the princ.i.p.al part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of the soul which is created by G.o.d, it ought simply to be said that He is a creature.