Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 33 (1/2)

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that ”the will is in the reason, and in the sensitive appet.i.te are the irascible and concupiscible parts.” Now sensuality signifies the sensitive appet.i.te. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12, 13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Obj. 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (A. 1).

But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): ”Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as Man He a.s.sumed my sorrow.” From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.

_I answer that,_ As was said (Q. 9, A. 1), the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of G.o.d must have a.s.sumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is the sensitive appet.i.te, which is called the sensuality.

Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appet.i.te, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appet.i.te, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be ”rational by partic.i.p.ation,” as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because ”the will is in the reason,”

as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is ”a will by partic.i.p.ation.”

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by partic.i.p.ation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent--not as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ a.s.sumed, but as regards the corruption of the _fomes,_ which was not in Christ.

Reply Obj. 3: ”Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one” (Aristotle, _Topic._ iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.

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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 3]

Whether in Christ There Were Two Wills As Regards the Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called _thelesis_, and the rational will which is called _boulesis_. Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.

Obj. 2: Further, the appet.i.tive power is diversified in man by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appet.i.te in man. But in the same way as regards man's apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational.

Obj. 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.]

ascribe to Christ ”a will of piety,” which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills.

_On the contrary,_ In every order there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the I-II, Q. 8, AA. 2, 3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else.

Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene _thelesis_--i.e. simple will, and by the masters ”will as nature,” is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls _boulesis_--i.e. counseling will, and the masters, ”will as reason.” But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially so called and not by partic.i.p.ation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called _thelesis_, and a will as reason, which is called _boulesis_.

Reply Obj. 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8).

Reply Obj. 3: The ”will of piety” would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another's evil, absolutely considered.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 4]

Whether There Was Free-will in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that _gnome_, i.e. opinion, thinking or cogitation, and _proairesis_, i.e. choice, ”cannot possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety.” But in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which choice is the act.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is ”a desire of something after taking counsel.” Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.