Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 78 (1/2)

Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf of Christ's Person: ”O all ye that pa.s.s by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow.”

_I answer that,_ As we have stated, when treating of the defects a.s.sumed by Christ (Q. 15, AA. 5, 6), there was true and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed ”sadness.” And in Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain.

For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (A. 5) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts--to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony, and besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): ”The words of my sins.” Secondly, especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Pa.s.sion. Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature.

The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect const.i.tution, since it was fas.h.i.+oned miraculously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some other things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness.

Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, because ”He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).

Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men's deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom.

From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain was the very greatest.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced--namely, from the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.

Reply Obj. 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 64, A. 2), moral virtue fixes the mean in the pa.s.sions, not according to mathematical quant.i.ty, but according to quant.i.ty of proportion, so that the pa.s.sion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)--namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 7:10): ”The sorrow that is according to G.o.d worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation.” And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quant.i.ty, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ's case, as stated above (cf.

Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 45, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpa.s.ses every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ's pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated soul.

But Adam's body could not suffer, except he sinned; so that he would become mortal, and pa.s.sible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than Christ's body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, [though this was impossible] his pain would have been less than Christ's.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpa.s.sed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Isa. 53:4: ”Surely He hath carried our sorrows.” But such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body, especially on account of the G.o.dhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in like fas.h.i.+on Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. 12:7: ”I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies.”

Reply Obj. 5: The sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime, whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compa.s.sionate him, according to Isa. 57:1: ”The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart.”

Reply Obj. 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from union with the G.o.dhead, but also how much, according to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 46, Art. 7]

Whether Christ Suffered in His Whole Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the ”act of the body.” But the soul is not, as to its every part, the ”act of the body”; because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said _De Anima_ iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

Obj. 2: Further, every power of the soul is pa.s.sive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the eternal types, ”to the consideration and consultation of which it directs itself,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul.

Obj. 3: Further, a sensitive pa.s.sion is said to be complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in Christ, but only ”pro-pa.s.sions”; as Jerome remarks on Matt. 26:37.

Hence Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that ”He endured only mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him.”

Consequently it does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul.

Obj. 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i), ”there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration.” Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf of Christ: ”My soul is filled with evils”: upon which the gloss adds: ”Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a peris.h.i.+ng people, by compa.s.sionating them.” But His soul would not have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul.

_I answer that,_ A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own pa.s.sion; and this comes of its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers by a pa.s.sion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is p.r.i.c.ked, or is disaffected by heat.

So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its essence, it is evident that Christ's whole soul suffered. For the soul's whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties, speaking thus of the proper pa.s.sions of the faculties, He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul's lower powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said above (A. 6). But Christ's higher reason did not suffer thereby on the part of its object, which is G.o.d, who was the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ.

Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ's soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of Christ's soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered.