Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 141 (1/2)
_On the contrary,_ Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament are divided by the division of dimensive quant.i.ty, as is evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quant.i.ty is the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.
_I answer that,_ It is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quant.i.ty of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having quant.i.ty and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quant.i.ty, hence Plato also a.s.signed ”great” and ”small” as the first differences of matter (Aristotle, _Metaph._ iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quant.i.ty; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in _Metaph._ iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quant.i.ty.
Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves.
Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quant.i.ty. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on account of quant.i.ty that substance can be divided, as is said in _Phys._ i. And therefore dimensive quant.i.ty itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence also dimensive quant.i.ty has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this quant.i.ty; for it belongs to dimension for it to be ”quant.i.ty having position” (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quant.i.ty can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about.
Reply Obj. 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when G.o.d makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another.
Reply Obj. 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive quant.i.ty, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quant.i.ty is the subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than conversely.
Reply Obj. 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter under dimensions; just as all other accidents likewise follow from the principles of substance. And consequently, as the accidents are preserved by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with matter, such as rarity and density, are preserved by Divine power.
Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical quant.i.ty abstracts not from intelligible matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in _Metaph._ vii. But matter is termed sensible because it underlies sensible qualities.
And therefore it is manifest that the dimensive quant.i.ty, which remains in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical quant.i.ty.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 77, Art. 3]
Whether the Species Remaining in This Sacrament Can Change External Objects?
Objection 1: It seems that the species which remain in this sacrament cannot affect external objects. For it is proved in _Phys._ vii, that forms which are in matter are produced by forms that are in matter, but not from forms which are without matter, because like makes like.
But the sacramental species are species without matter, since they remain without a subject, as is evident from what was said above (A.
1). Therefore they cannot affect other matter by producing any form in it.
Obj. 2: Further, when the action of the princ.i.p.al agent ceases, then the action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter rests, the hammer is moved no longer. But all accidental forms act instrumentally in virtue of the substantial form as the princ.i.p.al agent. Therefore, since the substantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6), it seems that the accidental forms which remain cannot act so as to change external matter.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing acts outside its species, because an effect cannot surpa.s.s its cause. But all the sacramental species are accidents. Therefore they cannot change external matter, at least as to a substantial form.
_On the contrary,_ If they could not change external bodies, they could not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a sensible thing, as is said in _De Anima_ ii.
_I answer that,_ Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation to action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what was said above (A. 1), it is an effect of the Divine power that the sacramental species continue in the being which they had when the substance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which they had while the substance of the bread and wine remained, now that the substance of the bread and wine has pa.s.sed into the body and blood of Christ. Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external bodies.
Reply Obj. 1: The sacramental species, although they are forms existing without matter, still retain the same being which they had before in matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are in matter.
Reply Obj. 2: The action of an accidental form depends upon the action of a substantial form in the same way as the being of accident depends upon the being of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Divine power that the sacramental species exist without substance, so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act without a substantial form, because every action of a substantial or accidental form depends upon G.o.d as the first agent.
Reply Obj. 3: The change which terminates in a substantial form is not effected by a substantial form directly, but by means of the active and pa.s.sive qualities, which act in virtue of the substantial form. But by Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacramental species, just as it was before: and consequently their action can be directed to a substantial form instrumentally, just in the same way as anything can act outside its species, not as by its own power, but by the power of the chief agent.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 77, Art. 4]
Whether the Sacramental Species Can Be Corrupted?
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter. But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is clear from what was said above (Q. 75, A. 2).
Therefore these species cannot be corrupted.
Obj. 2: Further, no form is corrupted except accidentally, that is, when its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are incorruptible, as is seen in spiritual substances. But the sacramental species are forms without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted.