Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 168 (2/2)

Reply Obj. 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on account of subsequent ingrat.i.tude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his subsequent ingrat.i.tude, but not absolutely, as stated above.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 88, Art. 4]

Whether the Ingrat.i.tude Whereby a Subsequent Sin Causes the Return of Previous Sins, Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ingrat.i.tude, whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin.

For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpa.s.sion which is a necessary condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v, 5). But justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingrat.i.tude is a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving is a special virtue. But ingrat.i.tude is opposed to thanksgiving. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now ingrat.i.tude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fas.h.i.+on, of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ That which is a sequel to every sin is not a special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful to G.o.d, as evidenced from what has been said (A. 1). Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not a special sin.

_I answer that,_ The ingrat.i.tude of the sinner is sometimes a special sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circ.u.mstance arising from all mortal sins in common committed against G.o.d. For a sin takes its species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that ”he who commits adultery in order to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer.”

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of G.o.d and of the favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of ingrat.i.tude, and in this way a sinner's ingrat.i.tude is a special sin.

If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt of G.o.d, his ingrat.i.tude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn to the species of the other sin, as a circ.u.mstance thereof. And, as Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies contempt of G.o.d in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the sinner's ingrat.i.tude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first (three) objections prove that ingrat.i.tude is in itself a special sin; while the last objection proves that ingrat.i.tude, as included in every sin, is not a special sin.

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QUESTION 89

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE (In Six Articles)

We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance?

(2) Whether they are restored in equal measure?

(3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent?

(4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin?

(5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance?

(6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are quickened by Penance?

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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 89, Art. 1]

Whether the Virtues Are Restored Through Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 6). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance.

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