Volume Ii Part 1 (1/2)

Pictures of German Life in the XVIIIth and XIXth Centuries.

Vol. II.

by Gustav Freytag.

CHAPTER VII.

AWAY FROM THE GARRISON.

(1700.)

A shot from the alarm-gun! Timidly does the citizen examine the dark corners of his house to discover whether any strange man be hid there.

The peasant in the field stops his horses to consider whether he would wish to meet with any fugitive, and earn capture-money, or whether he should save some desperate man, in spite of the severe punishment with which every one was threatened who enabled a deserter to escape.

Probably he will let the fugitive run away, though in his power, for in his secret soul he has a fellow feeling for him, nay, even admires his daring.

There is scarcely any sphere of earthly interest which stamps so sharply the peculiarities of the culture of the time, as the army and the method of carrying on war. In every century the army corresponds exactly with the const.i.tution and character of the state. The Franconian landwehr of Charles the Great, who advanced on foot from their _Maifeld_ to Saxony, the army of the n.o.ble cuira.s.siers who rode under the Emperor Barbarossa into the plains of Lombardy, the Swiss and Landsknechte of the time of the Reformation, and the mercenary armies of the Thirty Years' War, were all highly characteristic of the culture of their time; they sprang from the social condition of the people, and changed with it. Thus did the oldest infantry of the proprietors take root in the old provincial const.i.tution, the mounted chivalry in the old feudalism, the troops of Landsknechte in the rise of civic power, and the companies of roving mercenaries in the increase of royal territorial dominion; these were succeeded in despotic states, in the eighteenth century, by the standing army with uniform and pay.

But none of the older forms of military service were entirely displaced by those of later times, at least some reminiscences of them are everywhere kept. The ancient landfolge (attendants on military expeditions) of the free landowner had ceased since the greater portion of the powerful peasantry had sunk into bondsmen, and the strong landwehr had become a general levy, of little warlike capacity; but they had not been entirely set aside, for still in the eighteenth century all freeholders were bound at the sound of the alarum to hasten together, and to furnish baggage, horses, and men to work at the fortifications. In the same way the knights of the Hohenstaufen were dispersed by the army of free peasants and citizens, at Sempach, Grunson, Murten, and the lowlands of Ditmarsch, but the furnis.h.i.+ng of cavalry horses remained as a burden upon the properties of the n.o.bility; it was after the end of the sixteenth century--in Prussia, first under Frederic William I.--that it was changed into a low money-tax, and this tax was the only impost on the feudal property of n.o.bles.[1] The roving Landsknecht also, who provided his own equipments and changed his banner every summer, was turned into a mounted mercenary with an unsettled term of service; but in the new time the customs of free enlistment, earnest money, and entering into foreign service, were still maintained, although these customs of the Landsknecht time were in strange and irreconcilable contrast to the fearful severity with which the new rule of a despotic state grasped the whole life of the recruit.

The defects of the standing army in the eighteenth century have been often criticised, and every one knows something of the rigorous discipline in the companies with which the Dessauer stormed the defences of Turin, and Frederic II. maintained possession of Silesia.

But another part of the old military const.i.tution is not equally known, and has been entirely lost sight of even by military writers. It shall therefore be introduced here.

The regiments which the sovereigns of the eighteenth century led to battle, or leased to foreign potentates, were not the only armed organisation of Germany. Besides the paid army there was in most of the states a militia force, certainly very deficient in const.i.tution, but by no means insignificant or uninfluential. At no time had the old idea, that every one was bound to defend his own country, vanished from the German life. The right of the rulers to employ their subjects in the defence of their homes, was, according to the notions of the olden time, entirely distinct from their other right of keeping soldiers.

They could not command their subjects to render military service for their political struggles, nor for wars beyond the frontiers. Service in war was a free work, for that, they were obliged to invite volunteers, that is to say, to enlist, as they were unable to avail themselves of their va.s.sals. One of the greatest changes in the history of the German nation was owing to the conviction being gradually impressed upon the people, by the despotic governments in the former century, that they were bound to furnish their rulers with at least a portion of their soldiers. And it is not less instructive to find, that in our century, after the old system was destroyed, the general idea of defensive duty was imbibed by the people. It is worth while to investigate the way in which this happened.

Already, towards the end of the sixteenth century, when the Landsknechte had become too costly and demoralised, people began to think of forming a militia of the men capable of bearing arms in the cities and open country, which were to be employed for its protection within its frontiers. After 1613, this militia was organised in Electoral Saxony and the neighbouring countries, and soon after in the other circles of the Empire, and companies established, which were sometimes a.s.sembled and exercised in military drill. Their collective number was fixed and distributed among the districts, the communities appointed and armed the men, and if they were in service they received pay from the ruler.

The Thirty Years' War was for the most part carried on by enlisted soldiers, yet in case of need the militia were here and there turned into regulars; either whole regiments were appointed for field service, or the gaps in the enlisted troops were filled up by serviceable men.

But on the whole the loose organisation of this militia did not answer.

After the peace it was still less possible in the depopulated state of the country, to form from it a new military const.i.tution. For the citizen and peasant, as taxpayers, as well as for the cultivation of the now waste ground, were indispensable. The old imperfect const.i.tution of this civic army was, therefore, maintained. The only difference made in the militia at this period was that the men were chosen by the officers of the Sovereign and that the term of service was limited for the young men; the community fell into the back-ground, and the Sovereign became more powerful. In this manner were the militia brought together in companies and regiments, according to their circles, and exercised once or twice a year. Before the war the districts had provided them with weapons and equipments; now this also was done by the Sovereign; but in the cities the officers were appointed by the citizens; only the commanding officer was selected by the General The men were usually chosen by lot, and it is an interesting circ.u.mstance that, as early as 1711, the inscription on the Saxon ticket was ”_For Fatherland_.” But the military education was imperfect, exemptions were frequent, and the mode of filling up the vacancies inadequate.

And yet this militia more than once did good service; for instance, in Prussia. The armed country people, as they were called in the description of the battle of Fehrbelliner, were not a mere crowd that had flocked together, but the old organised country militia; they took an essential share in the first glorious deed of arms, in which the Brandenburgers beat a superior enemy by their own unaided efforts. In 1704, these militia were still much esteemed in Prussia, and those who were enrolled in it were exempt from all other military service.[2] It is true this was cancelled by Frederic William I., but in the Seven Years' War again established, and this militia did then good service against Sweden and Russia. In the Empire, also, and in Saxony, they were maintained, though weak, unwarlike and despised, till an altered state of civilisation made a new organisation of the national militia possible. Even now is this new const.i.tution not fully completed.

Entirely distinct from these militia were the soldiery, which the Sovereign maintained himself, and paid out of his revenue. It might be only a body of guards, for the protection and adornment of his court, or it might be many companies whom he levied in order to secure his own state, and by gaining influence and power among his equals, to obtain money. It was his own private affair, and if he did not overburden his people by it, no objection could be made. Those who served him also, did it of their own free will; they might engage themselves to other Sovereigns at home or abroad, who were obliged to keep the agreements they made with them. If the country were in danger from external enemies, the states granted the Sovereign money or a special contribution for these soldiers, for it was well known that they had more military capacity than the militia. Thus it was in Prussia under the great Elector, and so it remained in the greater part of Germany till late in the eighteenth century.

But this private army which the Sovereign had levied for himself had also acquired a new const.i.tution.

Till the end of the Thirty Years' War the enlistment, in most of the German armies, had taken place according to Landsknecht custom, at the risk of the Colonels. The Colonel concluded a contract with the Prince; he filled and sold the captains' commissions; the Prince paid the Colonel the money contributed by the district. Thus the regiments were essentially dependent on the Colonel, and this was a power which might be used against the Prince. The discipline was loose; the officers'

places occupied by creatures of the Colonel, and at his death the regiment was dissolved. The rogueries of Colonels and leaders of companies, which were already complained of in 1600 by the military writers, had attained a certain virtuosos.h.i.+p in their development.

Seldom were all the men whose names stood on the rolls, really under the banner. The officers drew the pay for numbers who were not there, who were called ”_Pa.s.sevolants_,” or ”_Blinde_,” and they appointed their grooms and sutlers, from the baggage-waggons, to be non-commissioned officers. In the Imperial army, also, complaints were endless of the most reckless selfishness from the highest to the lowest. In the midst of peace the officers plundered the hereditary States in which they were quartered; they fished and hunted in the environs, and claimed a portion of the city tolls; they caused beasts to be killed and sold; and set up wine and beer taverns. In like manner as the officers robbed, the soldiers stole. This continued still in 1677; and this plague of the country threatened to become lasting. The enlisting of recruits was still little organised in this early period; and the rogueries, which could not fail to accompany it, were at least unsanctioned by the highest authorities.

In Brandenburg the great Elector, immediately after his entrance on the government, reformed the connection between the regiments and the Sovereign; the enlistment was from thenceforth in his own name; he appointed the Colonel and the officers, who could no longer buy their commissions. Then first did the paid troops become a standing army, clothed, armed, and equipped alike, with better discipline, obedient instruments in the hands of the princes. This was the greatest advance in the military system since the invention of fire-arms; and Prussia owes to the early and energetic introduction of this new system its military preponderance in Germany. The commissariat, also, was reorganised; the men received, at least in war, their daily food in rations, and the provisions were supplied from great magazines. Through the efforts of Montecuculi, and later of Prince Eugene, Austria also, shortly before 1700, acquired a better disciplined standing army.

The whole complement of these troops could, up to 1700, be procured almost exclusively by free enlisting; for long after the great war the people continued in a state of restlessness, and had imbibed an adventurous spirit, to which military work was very enticing. This altered gradually. During the war-like period of Louis XIV., and from the increase of the French army, the German princes were compelled to a greater increase of their paid armies, and the loss of men occasioned by the incessant war had carried off many of the useless and bold rabble that collected round the banners. Even before the great war of succession the deficiency of men began to be felt; voluntary enlistment could nowhere any longer be obtained; complaints of the deeds of violence of the recruiting officers became at last troublesome. The military ruler, at last, began to scrutinize the men who seized under him, and sometimes had them exercised in companies. To use the militia for his warlike expeditions was impossible; they were too little trained, and, what was more important, they consisted more especially of respectable residents, whose labour and taxes could not be dispensed with by the State, as the n.o.bility, and, in Catholic countries, the ecclesiastics, contributed nothing to his income. Besides this, it was an unheard-of thing for the people to be compelled by force into military service. However much he might feel himself the master, this was an innovation too much against the general feeling; the people bore their taxes and burdens expressly that he might carry on war for them.

The peasant rendered service and soccage to his landlord, because in the olden time the latter had gone into the field for him. He then rendered taxes and service to the Sovereign because he had gone with his paid soldiers into the field for him, when his landlord was no longer willing to bear the burden; but now the peasant was to render the same service to landlord and Prince, and besides this to march himself to battle. This appeared impracticable; but again the pressure of bitter necessity was felt, and help must be found. Only the most indigent were to be taken--vagrants and idlers; but all whose labour was useful to the State, all who raised themselves in any sort out of the ma.s.s, were not to be disturbed.

Cautiously and slowly began the enlistment of the people for the military service of their Prince before 1700. It was proclaimed for the first time, but without success, that the country must supply recruits.

The innovation was first attempted, it appears, by the Brandenburger in 1693: the provinces were to enlist and present the number of men wanting, yet not villeins; and the leaders of companies were to pay two thalers earnest money to each man. Soon they went further; and first, in 1704, called upon particular cla.s.ses of tax-payers, and then in 1705 upon the community, to supply the necessary men. The recruits were to serve from two to three years, and those that willingly enlisted for six years and more were preferred. Exactly the same arrangement was made in Saxony in 1702 by King Augustus. There the communities had to provide for the Sovereign, as well as for the militia, an appointed number of young sound men, and to decide what individuals could be dispensed with. The enlistment-place was the Town-hall; the high-constables of the circles had the inspection. The man was delivered over without regimentals,--four thalers ready money were given,--the time of service two years,--and if the officer refused his discharge after two years, he who had served his time had the power to go away. Thus, timidly, did they begin to bring forward a new claim; and, in spite of all this caution, the opposition of the people was so violent and bitter that the new regulation was given up, and they returned again to enlistment. In 1708 forcible recruiting was abolished, ”because it was too great an exaction.” The iron will of Frederic William I. accustomed his people gradually to submit to this compulsion. After 1720 registers were made of children subject to military service, and in 1733 the ”_canton_”[3] system was introduced.

The land was divided among the regiments; the citizens and peasants were, with many exceptions, declared subject to military service. Every year were the deficiencies in the regiments filled up through levies, in which, it must be remarked by the way, the greatest despotism on the part of the captains remained unpunished.