Part 10 (1/2)

In providing this distinction for his native superior, the usually shrewd old minister intended to blind his countrymen and his rivals; and by another still more clumsy coup de theatre, he a.s.sumed to himself the position of a servant, as harmonizing with the rural dignity of Beadle or Headborough, which, as we have seen, he persisted in affecting. Decorated however by the blind old Emperor with the more sonorous appellations of Madar-ul-Maham, Ali Jah, Bahadur (”Exalted and valorous Centre of Affairs”), he played the Mayor-of-the-Palace with far more effect at Dehli than it would have been possible for him to do at Punah.

Circ.u.mstances, moreover, were now far more in his favour than they had been since 1785. During the three years that followed, the Rohillas of Ghausgarh were broken, Muhammad Beg was dead, the strength of the brave but indolent Rajputs was much paralyzed, and Najaf Kuli Khan - who never had opposed him, but might have been formidable if he pleased - had succ.u.mbed to a long attack of dropsy. Ismail Beg, it is true, was still in existence, and now more than ever a centre of influence among the Moghuls. But Ismail Beg was at present conciliated, having joined the Patel's party ever since his former a.s.sociate, Gholam Kadir, had proceeded to such criminal excesses in the palace. As a further means of attaching to him this important, even if not very intelligent chief, the Patel about this time conferred upon him a portion of Najaf Kuli's fief in the Mewat country south of Dehli.

By this he not only pleased the Moghul n.o.ble, but trusted to furnish him with occupation in the reduction and management of the wild mountaineers of that district. It was indeed idle to hope that Ismail Beg would remain faithful in the event of any future resurrection of the Musalman power; and it could not be denied that something of the kind might at any time occur, owing to the menacing att.i.tude of the Afghans, who were still very powerful under the famous Ahmad Abdali's son, Timur Shah. Indeed, this was a ceaseless difficulty during the whole of Madhoji's remaining life; and one that would have been still more serious, but for the anxiously pacific policy which, for the most part, characterized the British administration during that period. Nor did the Minister at this time enjoy the advantage of being served by European commanders. Lestonneaux retired suddenly in the beginning of 1789; and de Boigne, as above-mentioned, had also left the army, and was engaged in commercial pursuits at Lucknow.

But the army continued to comprise a certain proportion of regular troops; nor was it long before M. de Boigne, being earnestly solicited by Madhoji, and offered his own terms, resumed his command, augmented this portion of the force, and a.s.sumed a position of confidence and freedom which had not previously been allowed him. The skeletons of his two original battalions remained to form the nucleus of the new force. The battalion of Lestonneaux - or whatever the name - was deserted by its commandant, with eight months' arrears due to it, was disorganized and mutinous; and Sindhia meditated an attack upon it with an overwhelming body of horse. De Boigne however interceded, representing that the soldiers were not to blame for their colonel's defection and that their demand, though it might not be expressed with due respect, was after all founded on justice. Sindhia relented so far as to award a present payment of half the arrears, and a permission that the men should be absorbed in the brigade about to be formed; but the astute Savoyard took care first to make them pile their arms, so that their future entertainment should be as individuals only. The officers were at the same time cas.h.i.+ered; and thus the mutiny of a battalion was patiently and ingeniously suppressed without its precious material being lost to the service. The requisite new recruits were princ.i.p.ally raised from Rohilkand and Audh - the future nurseries of the famous Bengal army. The officers were the most respectable Europeans that the General could collect; and the non-commissioned posts were given to picked men of the old battalions.

The augmented force gradually reached the strength of three brigades, each brigade consisting of eight battalions of sepoys, each 700 strong; with 500 cavalry and forty fieldpieces. The General was allowed 10,000 rupees per mensem for his own pay, and a liberal scale was fixed for the European officers, whose number was from time to time increased, and the whole force, forming a small army in itself, marched under the white cross of Savoy, the national colours of its honourable chief. A gratuity was secured to all who might be wounded in action, and it was guaranteed that their pay should go on while in hospital. Invalids were to have pensions in money and grants of land.

It soon had to take the field: for Ismail Beg's loyalty, already wavering in view of an Afghan invasion, gave way entirely in the beginning of 1790 before the solicitations of the Rajput chiefs.

These high-spirited men, longing for an opportunity to strike another blow for national independence, fancied, and not without reason, that they could reckon upon the aid of the restless Ismail with whom they had already combined during the Lalsaut campaign in 1787.

The corps of de Boigne formed part of the army sent under the command of Sindhia's Mahratta generals, Lakwa Dada and Gopal Rao Bhao, to prevent if possible the junction of Ismail Beg with his Rajput allies. But the Moghul soldier of fortune was determined not to yield without a struggle. No sooner did he raise his standard than thousands of disbanded Afghan and Persian hors.e.m.e.n flocked to his headquarters. In March de Boigne left his employer at his favourite cantonment of Mathra, and sending before him a cloud of Mahratta horse, marched upon Ismail Beg with a complete brigade, including fifty pieces of artillery. On the morning of the 10th May they came upon him at a place called Patan, in the rocky country between Ajmir and Gwalior, not many miles from the scene of the former battle at Lalsaut. For three weeks or more nothing was effected, but on the 19th June Ismail announced his intention of attacking the Mahratta lines. De Boigne sent a messenger to say that he would spare him the fatigue of the journey, and advanced to the encounter with all his force on the following morning.

The Rajputs had come up; but there was no longer union between them; for the Patel, taking advantage of a temporary soreness felt by the Kachwahas of Jaipur on some trifling provocation, had contrived to secure their inaction before the battle began.

Notwithstanding this defection, a large body of infantry still stood firm, but European skill and resolution conquered in the end. Ismail at the head of his Moghul cavaliers repeatedly charged de Boigne's artillery, sabring the gunners at their posts. Between the charges the infantry were thinned by well-directed volleys of grape, and the squares had to be formed with the greatest rapidity as the cavalry of the enemy once more attacked them. De Boigne's squares, however, resisted all attempts throughout the afternoon, and a general advance of the whole line at length took place, before which the enemy gradually broke. De Boigne placing himself at the head of one of his battalions, ordered the others to follow, and precipitated his foot upon the enemy's batteries. The first was carried with the shock; at eight in the evening he was master of the second; the third fell an hour later; the Moghuls' resistance was completely overpowered, and their leader was chased into the city of Jaipur.

Ismail also lost in this engagement one hundred guns, fifty elephants, two hundred stand of colours and all his baggage; and on the following day a large portion of his army, amounting to seven battalions of foot and ten thousand irregular troops, went over to the victors. On this, as on many other occasions, the Mahratta cause was jeopardised by jealousies; Holkar holding aloof during the action, which would have begun earlier, and in all probability proved more decisive and with less loss, had he given due co-operation. There is a modest account of this action from de Boigne's pen in the Calcutta Gazette for 22nd July, 1790.

The letter is dated 24th June - four days after the battle - and does not represent the exertions of the Mahrattas in anything like the serious light adopted in Captain Grant Duff's work, to which I have been princ.i.p.ally indebted for my account of the action. The gallant writer estimates Ismail Beg's Moghul horse, however, at 5,000 sabres; and admits that the Mahrattas would have sustained severe loss but for the timely firmness of the regular battalions. The fact appears to be that the diminished Rajput infantry, deficient in discipline and zeal, and wanting the prestige and coolness inspired among Asiatics by the presence of European leaders, did not support the cavalry, and that the latter become exhausted by their vain a.s.saults upon the well-trained squares. Seeing this, de Boigne marched up his men (10,000 strong, by his own account), under the protection of a steady cannonade from his own guns, and stormed the enemy's camp.

He estimates his own loss at 120 killed and 472 wounded; the enemy's foot were not much cut up, because they were intrenched; ”but they have lost a vast number of cavalry.” He says of himself, ”I was on horseback encouraging our men; thank G.o.d I have realized all the sanguine expectations of Sindhia; the officers in general have behaved well; to them I am a great deal indebted for the fortune of the day.” This was the most important victory that Sindhia had ever gained, and fully justified the increased confidence that he had shown his Savoyard General. The memoir above cited, estimates the whole combined forces of the enemy at 25,000 foot and 20,000 horse, but it is probable that they were not all engaged. Patan, a fortress which has been compared to Gibraltar, was taken by storm after three days of open trenches, and Ismail Beg fled to the Panjab.

The Patel himself was not present with the army during this campaign, but remained at Mathra, which was a favourite residence of his, owing to its peculiar reputation for holiness among the Hindus. This ancient city, which is mentioned both by Arrian and by Pliny, is the centre of a small district which is to the wors.h.i.+ppers of Vishnu what Palestine is to Christians, and the Western part of Arabia is to the people of the Prophet. Here was born the celebrated Krishna, reported to be an incarnation of the Deity; here was his infant life sought by the tyrant Kans; hence he fled to Gujrat; returning when he came to man's estate, and partially adopting it as his residence after having slain his enemy.

We have seen how the general of Ahmad the Abdali ma.s.sacred the inhabitants, with a zeal partaking of the fanatic and the robber in equal proportions, in 1757. Since then the place, standing at the head of the Bhartpur basin, and midway between Dehli and the Rajput country, had recovered its importance, and now formed Madhoji's chief cantonment. Here it was that he received the news of the battle of Patan, and of the temporary disappearance of Ismail Beg; and hence he proceeded to Dehli, and there obtained a fresh confirmation of the office of Plenipotentiary for the Peshwa, together with two fresh firmans (or patents). One conferring upon himself the power to choose a successor in the Ministry from among his own family, and the other an edict forbidding the slaughter of horned cattle (so highly reverenced by the Hindus) throughout all the territory which still owned the sway, however nominal, of the Moghul sceptre.

Soon after he ordered his army, commanded as before, to return to Rajputana, and punish Bijai Singh, the Rathor leader of Jodhpur, for abetting the resistance of Ismail Beg. On the 21st of August the General arrived at Ajmir, and took the town on the following day. He then sat down to form the regular siege of the citadel, called Taragarh (a fastness strong by nature, and strengthened still more by art, and situated on an eminence some 3,000 feet above sea-level). Bijai Singh, in Rajput fas.h.i.+on, was ready to try negotiation, and thought that he might succeed in practicing upon one whom he would naturally regard in the light of a mercenary leader. He accordingly sent a message to de Boigne offering him the fort, with the territory for fifty miles round Ajmir if he would desert his employer. But the General sent him for answer that ”Sindhia had already given him both Jodhpur and Jaipur, and that the Rajah could not be so unreasonable as to expect him to exchange the whole of those territories for the portion offered.” After delivering himself of this grim piece of humour, and leaving a force to blockade the citadel, General de Boigne marched west to encounter the Rajah. Burning to retrieve the disgrace of Patan, Bijai Singh was marching up from Jodhpur to the relief of Taragarh when de Boigne met him at Mirta, a walled town about two marches distant from Ajmir and 76 miles N.E. of Jodhpur. It stands on high ground, the western wall being of mud, the eastern of masonry. On the 9th September the armies approached, and Gopal Rao was for attacking at once, but the General, with his accustomed coolness, pointed out that, not only were the men fatigued with marching and in need of repose, but that the day was too far advanced to allow of due pursuit being made should they - as was to be hoped - gain the action. It was therefore determined to try the effect of a surprise after the men had had a meal and a few hours repose. The forces on either side were not unequal. The Rajputs had the better in point of cavalry, their strength in this arm has been computed at 30,000 sabres. The Mahrattas had the advantage in artillery and in disciplined foot. The lines of the Rajputs were partially covered in rear by the walls of the town. But the spot was of evil omen.

Bijai Singh had sustained a severe defeat on this very ground near forty years before. Nevertheless, years had not taught the Rathors wisdom, nor misfortune schooled them to prudence. De Boigne came up in the grey of the morning, when the indolent Hindus were completely off their guard. And when the Rajah and his companions were roused from the drunken dreams of Madhu, they already found the camp deserted, and the army in confusion. Fifty field pieces were piercing the lines with an incessant discharge of grape-shot, and Colonel Rohan who commanded de Boigne's right wing had, with unauthorised audacity, thrown himself into the midst of the camp at the head of three battalions. Rallying a strong body of horse - and the Rajput cavaliers were brave to a fault - the Rajah fell furiously upon the advanced corps of infantry, which he hoped to annihilate before they could be supported from the main army. But European discipline was too much. for Eastern chivalry. Hastily forming hollow square the battalions of de Boigne awaited the storm; the infantry of Waterloo before the gendarmerie of Agincourt. The ground shook beneath the impetuous advance of the dust-cloud sparkling with the flashes of quivering steel. But when the cloud cleared off, there were still the hollow squares of infantry, like living bastions, dealing out lightnings far more terrible than any that they had encountered. The baffled hors.e.m.e.n wheeled furiously round on the Mahratta cavalry, and scattered them to the four corners of the field. They then attempted to gallop back, but it was through a Valley of Death. The whole of the regular troops of the enemy lined the way; the guns of de Boigne, rapidly served, pelted them with grape at point-blank distance; the squares maintained their incessant volleys; by nine in the morning nearly every man of the 4,000 who had charged with their prince lay dead upon the ground. Unfatigued and almost uninjured, the well-trained infantry of de Boigne now became a.s.sailants. The battalions rapidly deployed, and advancing with the support of their own artillery, made a general attack upon the Rajput line.

By three in the afternoon all attempt at resistance had ceased.

The whole camp, with vast plunder and munitions of war, fell into the hands of the victors. The middle-ages were over in India; and the prediction of Bernier was vindicated by the superiority of scientific warfare over headlong valour. The town was easily taken, and the fall of Taragarh, the lofty and almost impregnable-looking citadel that frowns above Ajmir, followed soon after. The echo of this blow resounded throughout native India. The Nana Farnavis heard it at Punah, and redoubled his Brahmin intrigues against his successful countryman. He likewise stimulated the rivalry of Takuji Holkar, who, with more of practical sagacity, resolved to profit by Sindhia's example, and lost no time in raising a force similarly organised to that which had won this great victory. De Boigne, almost worn out himself, allowed his victorious troops no time to cool, but marched on Jodhpur, and arrived at Kuarpur in the vicinity of the capital on the 18th of November. But his presence was enough. The Rajas of Udaipur and Jodhpur hastened to offer their submission to the chief who combined the prestige of the house of Timur with the glamour of the fire-eating Feringhee. Sindhia (to borrow a phrase from the gambling table) backed his luck. He gave de Boigne an increased a.s.signment of territory; and authority to raise two more brigades, on which by express permission of the blind old Shah was conferred the t.i.tle of Army of the Empire. The territory a.s.signed to the General extended from Mathra to Dehli, and over the whole Upper Doab, yielding a total revenue of about twenty-two lakhs of rupees, a large sum for those days. After liquidating the pay of the troops it was estimated that this left a balance in his favour of about 40,000 rupees a year besides his pay, and very large perquisites. He also exercised unlimited civil and military jurisdiction. His headquarters were at Aligarh, where he exercised quasi-royal sway over the whole surrounding country. Some further work, however, awaited de Boigne before he finally retired into purely civil administration. Among the last to hold out against the good fortune and genius of Sindhia was the founder of the present state of Indore, Jeswant Rao Holkar, who resolved to try the effect upon his rival of a blow struck with his own weapons. The Duke of Wellington in 1803 took much the same view of this fondness on the part of the Mahrattas for European discipline and fas.h.i.+ons in war as that vainly urged on Sheodasheo Rao by Malhar Rao Holkar in 1760. ”Sindhia's armies had actually,” so wrote General Wellesley in 1803, ”been brought to a very favourable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by the exertions of European officers in his service; but, I think, it is much to be doubted whether his power - or rather that of the whole Mahratta nation - would not have been more formidable if they had never had a European or an infantry soldier in their service, and had carried on their operations in the manner of the original Mahrattas, only by means of cavalry.” Malhar Rao and Wellesley were two great authorities; but, in any case, when once any State had introduced the new system, all its rivals were compelled to do likewise, and the State which did it with the most energy prevailed. The citation above given is from Owen's Selections, p. 336.

This was the hey-day of European adventure in the East. France, still under the influence of feudal inst.i.tutions, continued to send out brave young men who longed, while providing for themselves, to restore the influence of their country in India, shaken as it had been by the ill success of Dupleix, Lally, and Law. The native princes, on the other side, were not backward in availing themselves of this new species of wardog. A Frenchman was worth his weight in gold; even an Anglo-Indian - the race is now relegated to the office-stool - fetched, we may say, his weight in silver. But men of the latter cla.s.s, though not deficient in valour, and not without special advantages from their knowledge of the people and their language, were not so fully trusted. Doubtless the French officers would be more serviceable in a war with England; and that contingency was probably never long absent from the thoughts of the native chiefs. With the exception of the Musalman Viceroys of Audh and the Deccan, every native power dreaded the advance of the English, and desired their destruction. In fact, now that the Empire was fallen, a general Hindu revival had taken its place, the end of which was not seen till the Sikhs were finally subdued in 1849.

Holkar's new army was commanded by a French officer, whose name variously spelt, was perhaps du Drenec. He was the son of an officer in the Royal navy of France, and is described as an accomplished and courteous gentleman. He usually receives from contemporary writers the t.i.tle of Chevalier, and his conduct sustained the character of a well-born soldier.

1792. - The Patel lost no time in pus.h.i.+ng his success in the only quarter where he now had anything to fear. The combination of the Nana in the cabinet and Holkar with an Europeanized army in the field, was a serious menace to his power; and with enterprising versatility he resolved at once to counteract it. With this view he obtained khillats of invest.i.ture, for the Peshwa and for himself, from the Emperor, and departed for Puna, where he arrived after a slow triumphal progress, on the 11th of June, 1792. On the 20th of the same month the ceremony took place with circ.u.mstances of great magnificence; the successful deputy endeavouring to propitiate the hostility of the Nana by appearing in his favourite character of the Beadle, and carrying the Peshwa's slippers, while the latter sate splendidly attired upon a counterfeit of the peac.o.c.k throne. All men have their foibles, and Sindhia's was histrionism, which imposed on no one. The thin a.s.sumption of humility by a dictator was despised, and the splendid caparisons of the nominal chief were ridiculed by the Mahrattas and Brahmans of the old school.

Meanwhile Holkar saw his opportunity and struck his blow.

Profiting by the absence of his rival, he for the first time since 1773, advanced on Hindustan; and summoning Ismail Beg like an evil spirit from his temporary obscurity, he hurled him upon the country round the capital, while he himself lost no time in forcing a rupture with Sindhia's civil deputy in Rajputana.

In the northern part of the Rewari country is a place called Kanaund; about equidistant from Dehli and Hansi, to the south of both cities. Here Najaf Kuli Khan had breathed his last in a stronghold of earth faced with stone, on the borders of the great Bikanir desert, among sand-hills and low growths of tamarisk; and here his widow - a sister of the deceased Gholam Kadir - continued to reside. A call to surrender the fort to Sindhia's officers being refused by the high-spirited Pathan lady, gave Ismail Beg occasion to reappear upon the scene. He hastened to her aid, but found the place surrounded by a force under the command of M. Perron, a French officer whose name will often recur hereafter. The Beg, as usual, attacked furiously, and, as usual, was defeated. He took refuge in the fort which he contrived to enter, and the defence of which he conducted for some time. But the lady being killed by a sh.e.l.l, the garrison lost heart, and began to talk of throwing overboard the Moghul Jonah. The latter, obtaining from Perron a promise of his life being spared, and having that strong faith in the truth of his promise which is the real homage that Asiatics pay to Europeans, lost no time in coming into camp, and was sent into confinement at Agra, where he remained till his death a few years later.

Francklin, writing about 1794, says that he had no chance of deliverance so long as Mahratta sway endured at Dehli; but that he might, otherwise, still live to play a conspicuous part. But I believe he died about four years later. His residence was in the quarters near the Dehli Gate of the Fort, popularly known as Dan Sah Jat's house, still standing.

De Boigne meantime took the field in person against Holkar, who brought against him not only the usual host of Mahratta hors.e.m.e.n, but, what was far more formidable, four battalions of sepoys under Colonel du Drenec. The forces of the Empire, of somewhat inferior strength, brought Holkar to action at Lakhairi, not far from Kanaund, and on the road to Ajmir. The battle which ensued, which was fought in the month of September, 1792, was considered by M. de Boigne as the most obstinate that he ever witnessed. The ground had been skilfully chosen by du Drenec; he held the crest of a pa.s.s, his rear being partly protected by a wood; a marsh covered his front, while the sides were flanked by forests. The regular infantry was supported by a strong artillery, and guarded by 30,000 cavalry. Having reconnoitred this position from a rising ground, de Boigne advanced under a discouraging fire from Holkar's batteries; and as his own guns - whose advance had been unexpectedly impeded - came into action he hoped to silence those of the enemy. But his artillery officer was unlucky that day. A tumbril being struck in de Boigne's batteries, led to the explosion of ten or twelve others; and Holkar observing the confusion, endeavoured to extricate his cavalry from the trees, and charge, while du Drenec engaged the enemy's infantry. But the charge of Holkar's horse was confused and feeble (here Ismail Beg's absence must have been felt), and de Boigne sheltering his men in another wood, soon repulsed the cavalry with a well-directed and well-sustained discharge from 9,000 muskets. As they retreated, he launched his own cavalry upon them, and drove them off the field. It was now his turn once more to advance.

Re-forming his infantry and guns in the shelter of the thick tree-growth, he fell upon the left of the enemy where the regulars still maintained themselves. Raw levies as they were, they fought bravely but unskilfully till they were annihilated; their European officers were nearly all slain, and their guns taken, to the number of thirty-eight. The battle was lost without retrieval, mainly owing to the inefficiency of Holkar's horse; thus vindicating the wise, if premature, confidence of Ibrahim Gardi at Panipat more than thirty years before. Holkar, with the remnant of: his army, crossed the Chambal, and fell back on Malwa, where he revenged himself by sacking Ujain, one of Sindhia's chief cities.

While these things were taking place, a new rebuff was being prepared for himself by the Emperor, from whom neither age nor misfortune had taken that levity of character which, partly inherited from his ancestors, partly const.i.tutional to himself, formed at once his chief weakness and his greatest consolation.

In his dependent condition, enjoying but the moderate stipend of ninety thousand pounds a year for his whole civil list - and that not punctually paid - the blind old man turned envious thoughts upon the prosperity of the provinces which he had formerly ceded to his old protectors, the British. Accordingly, in July 1792, the Court newsman of Dehli was directed to announce that despatches had been sent to Punah, instructing Sindhia to collect tribute from the administration of Bengal. A similar attempt had been made, it will be remembered, though without success, in 1785 (vide sup. Pt. II. c. iv. in fin. ) The present attempt fared no better. This hint was taken certainly, but not in a way that could have been pleasant to those who gave it; for it was taken extremely ill. In a state-paper of the 2nd of August, Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor General, gave orders that information should be conveyed to Madhoji Sindhia to the effect that in the present condition of the Dehli court he, Sindhia, would be held directly responsible for every writing issued in the name of the Emperor, and that any attempt to a.s.sert a claim to tribute from the British Government would be ”warmly resented.” Once more the disinclination of the British to interfere in the Empire was most emphatically a.s.serted, but it was added significantly, that if any should be rash enough to insult them by an unjust demand or in any shape whatever, they felt themselves both able and resolved to exact ample satisfaction.