Volume IV Part 64 (1/2)
G. Chandler, and later an address at a public meeting in the Woman's Club House, of which Mrs. Caroline M. Severance was chairman.
Practically all were in favor of reviving the old Woman Suffrage League and an executive committee was appointed, Mrs. Sarah Burger Stearns (formerly of Minnesota), chairman.
At its call a meeting was held December 1, and the league reorganized: President, Mrs. Severance; vice-president, Mrs. Sh.e.l.ley Tolhurst; secretary, Mrs. Carl Schutz; treasurer, Mrs. Amelia Griffith; chairman of executive committee, Mrs. Stearns. A leaflet announcing the formation of the league, its plan of work, etc., was largely circulated. A committee was appointed who went before the Legislative Conference, which was held later in the Chamber of Commerce, and expressed the thanks of the league for the efforts of the Southern California members who had worked and voted for the School Suffrage Bill at the previous session of 1899.
The executive committee meets once a month and special sessions are called whenever necessary. The plan of work, as outlined by Mrs.
Stearns, was sent to the State convention at San Francisco and cordially approved.
In February half of a show window on Broadway was secured, with ample floor s.p.a.ce back of it. With the donation of $100 by a Los Angeles woman both were made attractive with flags, engravings and furnis.h.i.+ngs. Above a handsome desk the suffrage flag with its four stars is draped and photographs of prominent women adorn the walls.
The suffrage papers are kept on file and quant.i.ties of fresh literature are ready for distribution. Stationery, photographs, medallions, etc., are for sale, a register is open for the enrollment of friends and a member of the league is always in attendance. When another amendment campaign is to be made Southern California will be found ready for work and will declare in its favor by a largely increased majority.
LAWS: The original property law of California is an inheritance from the Mexicans, which it incorporated in its own code, and it is quite as unjust as those which still exist on the statute-books of some States as a remnant of the barbarous old English Common Law. Community property includes all which is acc.u.mulated by the joint labors of husband and wife after marriage. This is in the absolute control of the husband. Previous to 1891 he could dispose of all of it as if he had no wife, could will, sell, mortgage, pledge or give it away. That year the Legislature enacted that he could not make a gift of it or convey it without a valuable consideration, unless the wife consented in writing, although he could still dispose of it in ordinary business transactions without her knowledge or consent. The decision in the Spreckles case apparently nullified this law, as the gift was made in 1893 and the Supreme Court in 1897 declared it legal.[185]
In 1895 it was provided that at the husband's death the wife is ent.i.tled to one-half of what remains, subject to one-half of the debts. At the death of the wife the whole belongs absolutely to the husband without administration. If some portion of it may have been set apart for her support by judicial decree, this is subject to her testamentary disposition, or, if she makes none, it pa.s.ses to her heirs.
A homestead to the value of $5,000, which must continuously be occupied by the family, may be selected from the community property, or from the husband's separate estate, or from the wife's with her consent. If from the first-named it belongs to the survivor, if from the separate property it descends to his or her heirs, subject to the power of the court to a.s.sign it to the family for a limited period.
During marriage it can not be mortgaged or conveyed without the signature of both. In case of divorce, if it has been selected from community property, it may be a.s.signed to the innocent party absolutely or for a limited time, or it may be sold and the proceeds divided, according to decree. If selected from separate property it shall be returned to the former owner, but the court may a.s.sign it for a limited time to the innocent party.
In 1897 a law was pa.s.sed that if the estate is less than $1,500 it shall be a.s.signed to the widow, subject to inc.u.mbrances, funeral charges and expenses of settlement.
Separate property consists in what was possessed before marriage or is received by gift or inheritance afterwards. If the deceased leave wife or husband and only one child, or the lawful issue of one, the separate estate is divided in equal shares. If there be more than one child or the issue of one, the widow or widower is ent.i.tled to one-third. If there is no issue the survivor takes one-half and the other half goes to the father, mother, brothers and sisters of the deceased. If none exists, the survivor is ent.i.tled to the whole estate.
Either husband or wife may dispose of separate property without the consent of the other. Until 1894 it rested upon the wife to prove that property was her separate possession, but now the proof rests upon the contestants. Until 1897 she was compelled to prove that it was not paid for with community earnings. Neither of these recent laws applies to property acquired previous to May 19, 1889.
A married woman may be administrator or executor. (1891.)
The wife may engage in business as sole trader and her husband is not liable for her contracts, but her earnings, and also any wages she may make by her labor, are community property and belong absolutely to him, and suit for them must be brought by him. By becoming a sole trader she makes herself liable for the support of the family.
A married woman may sue and be sued and make contracts in regard to her separate property, but in torts of a personal nature she must be sued jointly with her husband, although the wife may defend in her own right.
Until 1899 common law marriage was legal, and this consisted merely in a promise and the mutual a.s.sumption of marital rights, duties and obligations. That year a law was pa.s.sed requiring a license and a civil or religious ceremony. The law declares specifically that ”the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him.”
The wife may sue for separate maintenance without divorce.
The father is the guardian of the minor children and ent.i.tled to their custody, services and earnings. At his death, or if he has abandoned his family, the guardians.h.i.+p belongs to the mother, if suitable.
The husband is expected to give his family proper maintenance. There is no penalty for not supporting a wife but he can be arrested for failure to support the children. If he have no property or is disabled from any cause, then the wife must support him and the family out of her property or her earnings. The husband decides what are necessaries and may take even her personal belongings to pay for them.
In 1887 the W. C. T. U. asked to have the ”age of protection” for girls raised from 10 to 18 years, but secured only 14. In 1895 they succeeded in having a bill pa.s.sed for 18 years but it was vetoed by Gov. James H. Budd. In 1897 they obtained one for 16 years which he signed and it is now the law. The penalty is imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than five years.
SUFFRAGE: Women possess no form of suffrage.
In 1900, to make a test case, Mrs. Ellen Clark Sargent brought suit before Judge M. C. Sloss, of the Supreme Court of San Francisco, to recover her taxes for that year, about $500. The city through its attorney filed a demurrer which was argued March 29 by George C.
Sargent, son of the plaintiff and a member of the bar. He based his masterly argument on the ground that a const.i.tution which declares that ”all political power is inherent in the people” has no right to exclude one-half of the people from the exercise of this inherent power. He quoted the most eminent authorities to prove that taxation and representation are inseparable; that the people of the United States would have been slaves if they had not enjoyed the const.i.tutional right of granting or withholding their own money; that it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people that no taxes can be imposed upon them except with their consent given personally or by their representatives. He said in closing:
If Article I of the State const.i.tution defines inalienable rights and Article II abrogates them, it is monarchy. The Code of Civil Procedure says that where one of two constructions is in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former shall be accepted. The question is whether the Court shall grant this right, or whether by toil and struggle it shall be wrung from the consciences of the electors.
The court decided that the case required a mandamus before the Registrar. Application was then made for a writ of mandate against the Registrar of Elections to compel him to place Mrs. Sargent's name upon the list of voters. Should this be denied she asked to have her taxes returned. Both demands were refused by Judge Sloss in the Superior Court. He took the ground that if Mr. Sargent's argument should be carried to its logical conclusion it would enfranchise idiots, lunatics and criminals; that if there is a conflict between the two sections of the const.i.tution cited it should be settled in favor of limiting the suffrage to males, as where a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former. He quoted various State Supreme Court decisions and declared that he decided the case according to the law.[186]
As Mrs. Sargent had every a.s.surance that this judgment would be sustained by the Supreme Court she did not carry the case further. It attracted attention and comment in all parts of the country and she received encouragement and wishes for her success from all cla.s.ses of society.