Volume IV Part 82 (1/2)
She may sue in her own name for injury to her person, property or character. The husband may maintain action for the loss of her society and services.
A wife can not convey or enc.u.mber her separate real estate without the joinder of her husband, nor can he do this with his separate real estate unless she joins. Husband and wife each may dispose of two-thirds of their real and personal estate by will without the consent of the other.
A married woman may without any legal formalities carry on business or trade or perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account and her earnings shall be her sole and separate property, provided she keeps her business distinct from her husband's, as all their joint earnings are his property.
A wife can act as executor or administrator of an estate only with her husband's consent.
No married woman can become surety for any person.
The father has the custody of the persons and the control of the education of the minor children, even though there may be a guardian appointed for their property. (1896.)
A wife may sue for support: (1) If deserted by her husband and left without means of support; (2) if he has been convicted of a felony and put in State prison; (3) if he is a habitual drunkard; (4) if he join a religious society prohibiting marriage. The court may award necessary support according to circ.u.mstances, may sell lands of the husband, or allow the wife to sell her lands without his joining.
(1896.)
The ”age of protection” for girls is 14 years. No bills presented by women to have it raised ever have been allowed to get beyond a legislative committee. The penalty is imprisonment in the penitentiary from one to twenty-one years.
SUFFRAGE: Women possess no form of suffrage. A decision of the Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 1901, that an amendment to be adopted must receive a majority of the highest number of votes cast at the election, has made it practically impossible to secure the franchise for women by changing the State const.i.tution. It is held, however, by lawyers whose opinion is of value, that this even now may be legally construed so as to permit them to vote.
Sustained in her own belief by these views and by a Supreme Court decision of 1893, which interpreted this const.i.tution to permit women to practice law (see Occupations), Mrs. Helen M. Gougar decided to make a test case, and offered her vote in the State election, Nov. 6, 1894, at her home in Lafayette. It was refused and she brought suit against the election board in the Superior Court of Tippecanoe County.
Sayler & Sayler and John D. Gougar, husband of the plaintiff, were her attorneys, but she was herself admitted to the bar and argued her own case before Judge F. B. Everett, Jan. 10, 1895. She based her masterly argument on the rights guaranteed to all citizens by the Federal Const.i.tution, and on the first article of the const.i.tution of Indiana, which declares that ”the General a.s.sembly shall not grant to any citizen, or cla.s.s of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens;” and she used with deadly effect the parallel between the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Antoinette D. Leach, by which she was enabled to practice law, and the claims which were now being made as to the right of women to vote.[252]
The long, adverse decision of Judge Everett was based upon his declaration that ”suffrage is not a natural right or one necessarily incident to such freedom and preservation of rights as are upheld by the National and State const.i.tutions;” that ”the intention of their framers to limit the suffrage to males is so strong that it can not be disregarded;” and that ”the legal and well understood rule of construction is that the express mention of certain things excludes all others.”
Mrs. Gougar then carried her case to the Supreme Court of Indiana, and was herself the first woman admitted to practice before that body. Her brief was filed by her attorneys and she made her own argument before the full bench, the court-room being crowded with lawyers and members of the Legislature. It was said by one of the judges to be the clearest and ablest oral argument presented since he had been a member.
Nevertheless the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. The decision, in which the five judges concurred, was founded almost exclusively upon the affirmation that ”that which is expressed makes that which is silent cease.” This decision reversed absolutely the one rendered in the case of Leach for the right to practice law, which had declared that ”although the statute says voters may practice, it says nothing about women, and therefore there is no denial of this right to them;” or in other words ”that which is expressed does _not_ make that which is silent cease.” Yet both of these opinions were written by the same Chief Justice--Leonard J. Hackney!
The decision closed by saying: ”Whatever the personal views of the Justices upon the advisability of extending the franchise to women, all are agreed that under the present const.i.tution it can not be extended to them.”
As it is practically impossible to amend the State const.i.tution, the outlook for woman suffrage in Indiana appears hopeless except through an amendment to the National Const.i.tution.
OFFICE HOLDING: Women are not eligible for election to any offices within the gift of the voters, except those pertaining to the public schools.
In 1873 the Legislature enacted that women should be eligible to any office the appointment or election to which is or shall be vested in the Governor or General a.s.sembly.
In 1881 it was enacted that women should be eligible to any office under the general or special school laws of the State.
Notwithstanding these liberal provisions there is scarcely one of the Northern States where so few women have served in office. There never has been even a woman candidate for that of State Superintendent. Many years ago there were a few county superintendents but none now fill that office and not half a dozen women ever have sat on local school boards. These are appointed by the Common Council in all the towns and cities except Indianapolis. On one occasion its Local Council of Women nominated two of its members for school trustees, but both were defeated. Women themselves were not allowed to vote, but their interest brought out an unusually large number of men.[253] At present not one woman is known to be filling any school office.
The law of 1873 includes the boards of all penal and benevolent inst.i.tutions, State Librarian, custodians of public buildings, and many minor offices, but women have found it practically impossible to secure any of these. The explanation for this probably lies in the fact that Indiana is a pivotal State in politics and the parties are so evenly divided that the elections are equally apt to be carried by either party. It thus becomes vitally necessary to utilize every office for political purposes and none can be spared to persons without votes. For a number of years the two parties elected women as State Librarian, and they gave much satisfaction, although several times the political pressure has been so great that the office has had to be given to men.[254]
A number of times bills have been presented to require the Governor to put a representation of women on the boards of all State inst.i.tutions where women and children are confined, but they never have been carried.
In 1873 the first State prison in the United States exclusively for women was opened in Indianapolis, but the management was vested in a board of men with a visiting board of women and a woman superintendent. In 1877 a bill was pa.s.sed placing the entire management of this Woman's Reformatory in the hands of women. An Industrial School for Girls is now under the same supervision.[255]
In 1889 an act of the Legislature established the State Board of Charities and Corrections and provided that two of its six trustees should be women. It exercises supervision over the State penal and benevolent inst.i.tutions. In 1899 a legislative act required that on pet.i.tion of fifteen citizens of any county the Circuit Judge must appoint a board to exercise the same supervision over its inst.i.tutions, to consist of four men and two women.
The only other women serving on State boards are one for the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Orphans' Home at Knightstown and one for the Home for Feeble-minded Youth at Ft. Wayne.[256]
The State Board of Charities and Corrections has made great effort to secure women physicians at all State Inst.i.tutions and, though there is no law authorizing it, there is now one at each of the four Hospitals for the Insane, and at the Woman's Prison and Girls' Industrial School. One was appointed for the Home for Feeble-minded but a man now holds the position.