Part 26 (1/2)
Napoleon, indeed, an, the command of the Channel The ostensible aims of the expedition were colonial The French fleets were to take on board 11,908 soldiers, of whom three-fourths were destined for the West Indies; and, in case Gantheaume did not join Villeneuve at Martinique, the latter was ordered, after waiting forty days, to set sail for the Canaries, there to intercept the English convoys bound for Brazil and the East Indies
In the spring and summer of 1805 Napoleon's correspondence supplies copious proof of the ideas and plans that passed through his brain
After fir the new Empire, he journeyed into Pied of Italy, and finally to Genoa In this absence of three thy letters to Decres attest the alternations of his hopes and fears He now keeps the possibility of failure always before hier breathe the crude confidence of 1803: and while facing the chances of failure in the West Indies, his thoughts swing back to the Orient:
”According to all the news that I receive, five or six thousand lish Co that our [West] Indian expedition is not fully successful, and I cannot reach the grand end which will dee the [East] Indian expedition for Septeo”[332]
How tenacious is his will! He here recurs to the plan laid down before Decaen sailed to the East Indies in March, 1803 Even the prospects of a continental coalition fail to dispel that gorgeous dream But amid much that is visionary we ainst England misses the mark, Napoleon has provided hiht of failure
It is needless to recount here the well-known details of Villeneuve's voyage and Nelson's pursuit The Toulon and Cadiz fleets got clear away to the West Indies, and after a last glance towards the Orient, Nelson set out in pursuit On the 4th of June the hostile fleets were separated by only a hundredthat Nelson was so close, decided forthwith to return to Europe After dise a fleet of fourteen British merchantmen, he sailed for Ferrol, in pursuance of orders just received from Napoleon, which bade him rally fifteen allied shi+ps at that port, and push on to Brest, where he ame, where the Atlantic was the chess-board, and the prize a world-empire, the chances were at this time curiously even Fortune had favoured Villeneuve but checked Gantheaued Nelson in the West Indies, but ulti to Europe, and sent a swift brig to warn the Admiralty, which was thereby informed of the exact position of affairs on July 8th, that is, twelve days before Napoleon himself knew of the state of affairs On July 20th, the French Elish newspapers_, that his fleet was on its return voyage: and his heart beat high with hope that Villeneuve would now gather up his squadrons in the Bay of Biscay and appear before Boulogne in overwhelued that, even if Villeneuve should keep right away from Brest, and leave blockaders and blockaded face to face, he would still be at least sixteen shi+ps stronger than any force that could be brought against hi the blunder which he so often censured in his inferiors He was ”lealoom and disaster shrouded the Union Jack; he conceived that Nelson had ed in chasing phantom French fleets around Ireland or to the East Indies
”We have not to do,” he said, ”with a far-seeing, but with a very proud, Govern the coast of Portugal, Cornwallis had been so speedily reinforced as to ht shi+ps of the line off Brest, while Calder aiting for Villeneuve off Cape Finisterre with a fleet of fifteen battleshi+ps Thus, when Villeneuve neared the north-west of Spain, his twenty shi+ps of the line were confronted by a force which he could neither overwhelht amidst a dense haze, was unfavourable to the allies, two Spanish shi+ps of the line striking their colours to Calder before the gathering fog and glooht separated the combatants: on the next two days Villeneuve strove to come to close quarters, but Calder sheered off; thereupon the French, unable then to norant of their position, joined Cornwallis off Brest This retreat of the British adned in London when Villeneuve was known to be on the Spanish coast unguarded; but the fear was needless; though the French ad the Ferrol squadron, yet, as he was ordered to avoid Ferrol, he put into Corunna, and on August 15th he decided to sail for Cadiz
To realize the immense importance of this decision we must picture to ourselves the state of affairs just before this tied by te that no French shi+ps had passed the straits, he doubled back in hot haste northwards, and there is clear proof that his speedy return to the coast of Spain spread dismay in official circles at Paris ”This unexpected union of forces undoubtedly renders every scheme of invasion impracticable for the present,” wrote Talleyrand to Napoleon on August 2nd, 1805[333]
Missing Villeneuve off Ferrol, Nelson joined Cornwallis off Ushant on the very day when the French ad on to Portsmouth, the hero now enjoyed a few days of well-earned repose, until the nation called on him for his final effort
Meanwhile Napoleon had arrived on August 3rd at Boulogne, where he reviewed a line of soldiery nine ht well arouse his hopes of assured victory He had ground for hoping that Villeneuve would soon be in the Channel Not until August 8th did he receive news of the fight with Calder, and he took pains to parade it as an English defeat He therefore trusted that, in the spirit of his orders to Villeneuve dated July the 26th, that adather up other French and Spanish shi+ps, and return to Ferrol and Brest with a hty force of some sixty sail of the line:
”I count on your zeal for my service, on your love for the fatherland, on your hatred of this Pohich for forty generations has oppressed us, and which a little daring and perseverance on your part will for ever reduce to the rank of the small Powers: 150,000 soldiersand the crews complete are elish cruisers, for line of broadsides froe, and it alone, land”
Austria and Russia were alreadytheir forces for the war of the Third Coalition Yet, though menaced by those Powers, to whorant provocations, this astonishi+ng land, and secretly derided their preparations ”You need not” (so he wrote to Eugene, Viceroy of Italy) ”contradict the newspaper rumours of war, but make fun of them Austria's actions are probably the result of fear”--Thus, even when the eastern horizon lowered threateningly with clouds, he continued to pace the cliffs of Boulogne, or gallop restlessly along the strand, straining his gaze ard to catch the first glimpse of his armada That horizon was never to be flecked with Villeneuve's sails: they were at this time furled in the harbour of Cadiz
Unmeasured abuse has been showered upon Villeneuve for his retreat to that harbour But it must be remembered that in both of Napoleon's last orders to him, those of July 16th and 26th, he was required to sail to Cadiz under certain conditions In the first order prescribing alternative ways of gaining the mastery of the Channel, that step was recommended solely as a last alternative in case ofand difficult inlet of Ferrol, but, after collecting the squadron there, to cast anchor at Cadiz In the order of July 26th he was charged positively to repair to Cadiz: ”My intention is that you rally at Cadiz the Spanish shi+ps there, dise there ain set sail, return to Ferrol, etc” Villeneuve seems not to have received these last orders, but he alludes to those of July 16th[334]
These, then, were probably the last instructions he received fro sail froust 13th
The censures passed on his retreat to Cadiz are therefore based on the supposition that he received instructions which he did not receive[335] He expressly based his move to Cadiz on Napoleon's orders of July 16th Thesuch a step had, in Villeneuve's eyes, actually happened The adht of July 22nd _la malheureuse affaire;_ his shi+ps were encuust 15th a north-east gale carried away the top- heard from a Danish merchantman the news--false news, as it afterwards appeared--that Cornwallis with twenty-five shi+ps was to the north, he turned and scudded before the wind He could not divine the disastrous influence of his conduct on the plan of invasion He did not know that histo hesitate between a dash on London or a can on the Danube, and that the events of the next few days were destined to tilt the fortunes of the world Doubtless he ought to have disregarded the Eled on to Brest, as his earlier and wider orders enjoined But the Emperor's instructions pointed to Cadiz as the rendezvous in case of reat difficulty As a matter of fact, Napoleon on July 26th ordered the Rochefort squadron to _meet Villeneuve at Cadiz;_ and it is clear that by that date Napoleon had decided on that rendezvous, apparently because it could be more easily entered and cleared than Ferrol, and was safer from attack But, as it happened, the Rochefort squadron had already set sail and failed to sight an enemy or friend for several weeks
Such are the risks of naval warfare, in which even the greatest geniuses at tiroped but blindly Nelson was not afraid to confess the truth The French Emperor, however, seems never to have ic infallibility Even nohen the Spanish shi+ps were proved to clog the enterprise, he persisted inthat Villeneuve ht still neutralize the force of Calder and Cornwallis These hopes he cherished up to August 23rd, when, as the next chapter will show, he faced right about to confront Austria His Minister of Marine, who had ed the difficulties of all parts of the naval enterprise, continued earnestly to warn hi Villeneuve's shi+ps with the unseaworthy craft of Spain and of trusting to this ill-assorted armada to cover the invasion now that their foes had divined its secret The Emperor bitterly upbraided his Minister for his timidity, and in the presence of Daru, Intendant General of the arainst Villeneuve for his violation of orders: ”What a navy! What an ad! My hopes are frustrated--- Daru, sit down and write”--whereupon it is said that he traced out the plans of the can which was to culminate at Ulm and Austerlitz[336]
The question has often been asked whether Napoleon seriously intended the invasion of England Certainly the experienced sealand, France, and Holland, with few exceptions, declared that the flat-bottohtful disaster must ensue if they were met out at sea by our shi+ps When it is further remembered that our coasts were defended by batteries and martello towers, that several hundreds of pinnaces and row-boats were ready to attack the flotilla before it could attempt the disembarkation of horses, artillery, and stores, and that 180,000 regulars and militia, aided by 400,000 volunteers, were ready to defend our land, the difficulties even of capturing London will be obvious And the capture of the capital would not have decided the contest Napoleon seee to St
Helena he said: ”I put all to the hazard; I entered into no calculations as to the manner in which I was to return; I trusted all to the impression the occupation of the capital would have occasioned”[337]--But, as has been shown above (p 441), plans had been secretly drawn up for the removal of the Court and the national treasure to Worcester; the cannon of Woolere to be despatched into the Midlands by canal; and our military authorities reckoned that the systematic removal of provisions and stores from all the districts threatened by the ene before he overran the home counties Besides, the invasion was planned when Britain's naval power had been merely evaded, not conquered Nelson and Cornwallis and Calder would not for ever be chasing phantom fleets; they would certainly return, and cut Napoleon froain, if Napoleon was bent solely on the invasion of England, why should he in June, 1805, have offered to Russia and Austria so gratuitous an affront as the annexation of the Ligurian Republic? He must have known that this act would hurry therave fault” in the Emperor's policy--but many have doubted whether Napoleon did not intend Genoa to be the gate leading to a new avenue of glory, now that the success of his naval dispositions was doubtful Marbot gives the general opinion of military circles when he says that the Emperor wanted to provoke a continental war in order to escape the ridicule which the failure of his Boulogne plans would otherwise have aroused ”The new coalition ca situation” The coenuine, enerally correct, took the same view He attributes to Napoleon the noteworthy words: ”I may fail by sea, but not by land; besides, I shall be able to strike the blow before the old coalition s have neither activity nor decision of character: I do not fear old Europe” The Emperor also remarked to the Council of State that the expense of all the preparations at Boulogne was fully justified by the fact that they gave him ”fully twenty days' start over all ene the troops and bringing the the Continental Powers: and that pretext was afforded land”[338]
It is also quite possible that his ailand
It certainly was in the plan of September, 1804: and doubtless it still held a pro the few days when he pictured Calder vanquished and Nelson scouring the West Indies Then he doubtless fixed his gaze solely upon London But there isat least a very iwood believed hi at Ireland[339]
But indeed Napoleon is often unfathomable Herein lies much of the charm of Napoleonic studies He is at once the Achilles, the Mercury, and the Proteus of the rasped all problems and suddenly concentrated its force on some new plan may well perplex posterity as it dazed his conte with any other land, before the command of the sea had been secured, was infinitely less likely than a descent on Ireland The landing of a _corps d'armee_ there would have provoked a revolution; and British ascendancy would have vanished in a week Even had Nelson returned and swept the seas, Ireland would have been lost to the United Kingdom; and Britain, exhausted also by the expenses which the Boulogne preparations had compelled her to make for the defence of London,all his fortunes on the conquest of England, it can be proved that his radually cleared of illusions He trusted that a popular rising would overthrow the British Government: people and rulers showed an accord that had never been known since the reign of Queen Anne He believed, for a short space, that the flotilla could fight sea-going shi+ps out at sea: the converse was proved up to the hilt Finally, he trusted that Villeneuve, when burdened with Spanish shi+ps, would outwit and outmanoeuvre Nelson!