Part 4 (1/2)

ADDITIONAL ESSAYS, p 517-p 577

As the voluiven in my references, it will be easy, by the help of this table, to learn where to look for any passage cited, in differently arranged editions

FOOTNOTES:

[8] ”Pneumatic philosophy” must not be confounded with the theory of elastic fluids; though, as Scottish chairs have, before now, combined natural with civil history, the mistake would be pardonable

[9] Burton's _Life of David Hume_, i p 354

[10] Lord Macaulay, Article on History, _Edinburgh Review_, vol lxvii

[11] Letter to Clephane, 3rd September, 1757

[12] ”You h a character for piety, that his taking eneration to me, and all past offences are noiped off But all these views are trifling to one of e and temper”--_Hume to Edmonstone_, 9th January, 1764 Lord Hertford had procured hi, and the secretaryshi+p orth 1000 a year

[13] Madaives a ludicrous account of Hume's performance when pressed into a _tableau_, as a Sultan between two slaves, personated for the occasion by two of the prettiest woarde attentiveenoux a plusieurs reprises et ne trouve jamais autre chose a leur dire que _Eh bien! mes demoiselles--Eh bien! vous voila donc Eh bien! vous voilavous voila ici?_ Cette phrase dura un quart d'heure sans qu'il put en sortir Une d'elles se leva d'impatience: Ah, dit-elle, je er du veau!”--Burton's _Life of Hume_, vol ii p 224

PART II

_HUME'S PHILOSOPHY_

CHAPTER I

THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

Kant has said that the business of philosophy is to answer three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and For what may I hope?

But it is pretty plain that these three resolve the run, into the first For rational expectation and moral action are alike based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification, unless its subject-e, and unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience iuarantee of credibility

Fundamentally, then, philosophy is the answer to the question, What can I know? and it is by applying itself to this probleuished as a special department of scientific research

What is commonly called science, whether ical, consists of the anshich ive to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of the ; while philosophy, in the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the first principles which those operations assuh, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy, its distinctness froation may be properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of its subject-matter, it is intimately and, indeed, inseparably connected with one branch of science For it is obviously impossible to answer the question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear understanding as to what issettled this point, the next step is to inquire hoe coe; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the knowable or not While, finally, inase of the past or of the present, but to the confident expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to ask, further, what justification can be alleged for trusting to the guidance of our expectations in practical conduct

It surely needs no argumentation to show, that the first problem cannot be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and the detere

Nor can the second problem be dealt with in any other fashi+on; for it is only by the observation of the growth of knowledge that we can rationally hope to discover holedge grows But the solution of the third problem simply involves the discussion of the data obtained by the investigation of the foregoing two

Thus, in order to answer three out of the four subordinate questions into which What can I know? breaks up, we ation of mental phenomena, the results of which are ey is a part of the science of life or biology, which differs from the other branches of that science, merely in so far as it deals with the psychical, instead of the physical, phenomena of life

As there is an anatomy of the body, so there is an anatoist dissects mental phenomena into elementary states of consciousness, as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues into cells The one traces the developans fro up of coht As the physiologist inquires into the way in which the so-called ”functions” of the body are perforist studies the so-called ”faculties” of the mind Even a cursory attention to the ways and works of the lower aniy of the mind; and the doctrine of evolution presses for application as much in the one field as in the other