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And now the question arises, whether any, and if so what, portion of these contents of theto Locke, ”Knowledge is the perception of the agreeh he does not say so in so many words, tacitly accepts the definition It follows, that neither sie; but that, when impressions of relation are added to these ie arises; and that all knowledge is the knowledge of likenesses and unlikenesses, co-existences and successions
It reallyas the saidly attached to them; and, therefore, it is hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally accepted, though very arbitrary, lie” But, on the face of the matter, it is not obvious why the impression we call a relation should have a better claie, than that which we call a sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has this unfortunate result, that it excludes all the most intense states of consciousness froe”
For exa as to exclude all other fore; but becoe the moment we think of it in relation to another pain, or to some other mental phenomenon Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, for there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and knowing one has it: they are simply two phrases for the sareat capital out of the a with the assue is the perception of relations, and finding themselves, like mere come, they at once gratify that disposition and save their consistency, by declaring that even the simplest act of sensation contains two terenous object, and that reat triad, as fronostic Trinity, eical shadows and all the _Fata Morgana_ of philosophical dreamland
FOOTNOTES:
[18] ”Consciousnesses” would be a better name, but it is aard I have elsewhere proposed _psychoses_ as a substantive name for mental phenomena
[19] As this has been denied, it ive Descartes's words: ”Par le mot de penser, j'entends tout ce que se fait dans nous de telle sorte que nous l'apercevons immediatement par nous-iner, mais aussi sentir, c'est le meme chose ici que penser”--_Principes de Philosophie_ Ed
Cousin 57
”Toutes les proprietes que nous trouvons en la chose qui pense ne sont que des facons differentes de penser”--_Ibid_ 96
[20] On the whole, it is pleasant to find satisfactory evidence that Hu of the works of Spinoza; for the invariably abusive manner in which he refers to that type of the philosophic hero is only to be excused, if it is to be excused, by sheer ignorance of his life and work
[21] For exa pride and hu as our idea of ourselves is eous, we feel either of these opposite affections, and are elated by pride or dejected with humilitywhen self enters not into the consideration there is no room either for pride or humility” That is, pride is pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain conceptions of one's self; or, as Spinoza puts it:--”Superbia est de se prae a ”laetitia concomitante idea causae externae”); and ”Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur”
CHAPTER III
THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS
Ads of pleasure and pain, and those of relation, are the primary irresolvable states of consciousness, two further lines of investigation present thein of these ”impressions;” the other, to inquire into the nature of the steps by which they become metamorphosed into those coely enter into our ordinary trains of thought
With respect to the origin of impressions of sensation, Hume is not quite consistent with himself In one place (I p 117) he says, that it is impossible to decide ”whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the ,” thereby i that realism and idealism are equally probable hypotheses But, in fact, after the demonstration by Descartes, that the ies in the nervous systes have no sort of resemblance, the hypothesis that sensations ”arise immediately from the object” was out of court; and that Hume fully admitted the Cartesian doctrine is apparent when he says (I p 272):--
”All our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and anih in relation to another question, he observes:--
”There are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the senses The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion, and solidity of bodies The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat, and cold The third are the pains and pleasures that arise fro of our flesh with steel, and such like Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continued existence The vulgar only regard the second as on the saain esteem the third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and dependent beings
”Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not fro is the prejudice for the distinct continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary opinion is advanced by ine they can almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy 'Tis also evident that colours, sounds, &c, are originally on the sa with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference betwixt theination For as they are confessed to be, both of theurations and motions of the parts of body, wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, then, we es, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence”--(I p
250, 251)
The last words of this passage are asBerkeley in his deductions fro citation shows, fully adopted the conclusion to which all that we know of psychological physiology tends, that the origin of the elements of consciousness, no less than that of all its other states, is to be sought in bodily changes, the seat of which can only be placed in the brain And, as Locke had already done with less effect, he states and refutes the arguainst the possibility of a causal connexion between the modes of motion of the cerebral substance and states of consciousness, with great clearness:--