Part 8 (1/2)

”wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the sa or process of the understanding, ays say that this propensity is the effect of _Custoiven the ultimate reason of such a propensity We only point out a principle of hued, and which is well known by its effects”--(IV p 52)

It has been shown that an expectation is a complex idea which, like a memory, is made up of two constituents The one is the idea of an object, the other is the idea of a relation of sequence between that object and so which applied to memories applies to expectations To have an expectation[25] of a given event, and to believe that it will happen, are only two ain, just in the saive the sa And the fact already cited, that a child before it can speak acts upon its ood evidence that it for neither of ”sugar-plum” nor of ”sweet,”

nevertheless is in full possession of that coe, will take the forar-plum will be sweet”

Thus, beliefs of expectation, or at any rate their potentialities, are, as much as those of memory, antecedent to speech, and are as incapable of justification by any logical process In fact, expectations are but memories inverted The association which is the foundation of expectation must exist as a memory before it can play its part As Hume says,--

”it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, e assert that after the constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flaht and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other This hypothesis seems even the only one which explains the difficulty e draw from a thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is in no respect different frouide of human life It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past”

”All belief of matter-of-fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and so found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flaether: if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to _believe_ that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances It is an operation of the soul, e are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, e receive benefits, or hatred, e meet with injuries All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent”--(IV pp 52-56)

The only comment that appears needful here is, that Huht to that repetition of experiences to which alone the term ”custom” can be properly applied The proverb says that ”a burnt child dreads the fire”; and any one illis quite sufficient to establish an indissoluble belief that contact with fire and pain go together

As a sort of inverted memory, expectation follows the same laws; hence, while a belief of expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says, established by custom, or the repetition of weak i experience In the absence of language, a specific thened by repetition It is obvious that that which has happened cannot happen again, with the same collateral associations of co-existence and succession But, memories of the co-existence and succession of ithened by the recurrence of sih the collateral associations are totally different; in fact, the ideas of these ieneric

If I recollect that a piece of ice was cold yesterday, nothing can strengthen the recollection of that particular fact; on the contrary, it roeaker, in the absence of any record of it But if I touch ice to-day and again find it cold, the association is repeated, and the er And, by this very simple process of repetition of experience, it has beco handled ice without thinking of its coldness But, that which is, under the one aspect, the strengthening of a memory, is, under the other, the intensification of an expectation Not only can we not think of having touched ice, without feeling cold, but we cannot think of touching ice, in the future, without expecting to feel cold An expectation so strong that it cannot be changed, or abolished, enerated out of repeated experiences And it is important to note that such expectationsroom, a certain can is usually kept full of water, and I a Sootten to fill it, and then I find that, when I take hold of the handle, the can goes up with a jerk Long association has, in fact, led ht; and, quite unawares, my muscular effort is adjusted to the expectation

The process of strengthening genericexpectations of succession, is what is commonly called _verification_ The impression B has frequently been observed to follow the impression A The association thus produced is represented as the ain, the idea of B follows, associated with that of the immediate appearance of the impression B If the impression B does appear, the expectation is said to be verified; while the ives rise in turn to a stronger expectation And repeated verificationthat its non-verification is inconceivable

FOOTNOTES:

[24] It is not worth while, for the present purpose, to consider whether, as all nervous action occupies a sensible tiht not overlap that of the impression which follows it, in the case supposed

[25] We give no name to faint e a part in huether with the associated euished as ”hopes” or ”fears”

CHAPTER V

THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS

In the course of the preceding chapters, attention has been more than once called to the fact, that the elements of consciousness and the operations of the mental faculties, under discussion, exist independently of and antecedent to, the existence of language

If any weight is to be attached to argu evidence in favour of the belief that children, before they can speak, and deaf s to which those who have acquired the faculty of speech apply the nas of relation; that trains of ideas pass through their eneric ideas are for these, ideas of memory and expectation occupy a most important place, inasmuch as, in their quality of potential beliefs, they furnish the grounds of action This conclusion, in truth, is one of those which, though they cannot be dehly probable and cannot be disproved, we are quite safe in accepting it, as, at any rate, a good working hypothesis

But, if we accept it, we s Whatever cogency is attached to the arguments in favour of the occurrence of all the funda children and deaf mutes, an equal force must be allowed to appertain to those which her animals have minds

We ly when he says--

”no truth appears to ht and reason as well as uments are in this case so obvious, that they never escape the norant”--(I p 232)

In fact, this is one of the few cases in which the conviction which forces itself upon the stupid and the ignorant, is fortified by the reasonings of the intelligent, and has its foundation deepened by every increase of knowledge It is not merely that the observation of the actions of aniests the attribution to them ofactions in men The minute comparison which has been instituted by anatoans which we know to constitute the apparatus of thought in ans in brutes, has demonstrated the existence of the closest similarity between the two, not only in structure, as far as the microscope will carry us, but in function, as far as functions are determinable by experiment There is no question in the mind of any one acquainted with the facts that, so far as observation and experiment can take us, the structure and the functions of the nervous syste, and in a estion that we must stop at the exact point at which direct proof fails us; and refuse to believe that the similarity which extends so far stretches yet further, is no better than a quibble Robinson Crusoe did not feel bound to conclude, frole human footprint which he saw in the sand, that the

Structure for structure, down to the minutest ans, the nerves, the spinal cord, the brain of an ape, or of a dog, correspond with the saans in the human subject Cut a nerve, and the evidence of paralysis, or of insensibility, is the same in the two cases; apply pressure to the brain, or adence disappear in the one as in the other Whatever reason we have for believing that the changes which take place in the norive rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists for the belief that the modes of , produce like effects

A dog acts as if he had all the different kinds of inisant Moreover, he governs his s of distance, form, succession, likeness, and unlikeness, hich we are faenerated in his s frequently appear to dreaoes on in them while they are asleep; and, in that case, there is no reason to doubt that they are conscious of trains of ideas in their waking state Further, that dogs, if they possess ideas at all, have memories and expectations, and those potential beliefs of which these states are the foundation, can hardly be doubted by any one who is conversant with their ways Finally, there would appear to be no valid argueneric ideas of sensible objects One of theard paid to external respectability The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed eneric idea” of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion, and that of sleek broadcloth associated with the idea of liking?