Part 42 (1/2)

Rosecrans' conduct of this battle caused his supersedure by Thomas, while several division commanders were suspended, pending an inquiry into their course. President Davis removed General Leonidas Polk, who was thought to have shown hesitancy of action at critical points. Bragg, however, was the most blamable, for, with the advantage overwhelmingly in his favor, he refused to permit Longstreet to follow up his success.

One of the peculiarities of the Confederate President was his strong likes and dislikes. He was a personal enemy of Jo Johnston, and more than once humiliated him, but he was also a friend of Bragg, and, in the face of indignant protests, retained him in chief command in the southwest.

As soon as the Union army reached Chattanooga intrenchments were thrown up. Bragg appeared before the town on the 23d, and, finding the position too strong to be carried by a.s.sault, he laid siege to it. The situation of the army became so dangerous that great uneasiness was felt in Was.h.i.+ngton, where the wise step was taken of sending General Grant thither, with his appointment to the command of the entire West.

Abundant reinforcements were hurried to the imperiled point, the entire Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac forming the princ.i.p.al commands. The Federals became much the stronger, but Bragg did not abandon his siege of Chattanooga.

Recalling the advance of Burnside from the Ohio to the relief of Rosecrans, it should be stated that he did not arrive in time to take part in the battle of Chickamauga, but occupied Knoxville on the 9th of September. Bragg sent Longstreet with a strong force to attack Burnside, the Confederate commander thereby weakening his army, which could ill stand it. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the night of October 20th, and telegraphed Burnside to hold Knoxville at all hazards, while he gave his attention to Bragg.

Sherman came up with his troops November 15th, and a week later Grant had an army of 80,000 men on the ground, while the removal of Longstreet left Bragg with only 50,000. His line, twelve miles long, embraced two elevations commanding a view of Chattanooga Valley. Lookout Mountain was on the south, while Missionary Ridge on the east was not quite so high.

The Confederate left wing rested on the former, and the right on Missionary Ridge, with the Chattanooga flowing between. Bragg was justified in considering his position impregnable.

THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS.

Grant, however, held a different opinion. On the night of the 23d the enemy's picket lines were forced back and an improved position secured.

The following morning, Hooker, having already crossed the river, was ordered to attack the position on Lookout Mountain. His movements were hidden for a time by a dense fog, and it was his intention to stop as soon as the enemy's rifle-pits at the base were captured; but, when this was accomplished, the men were carried away by their enthusiasm, noting which Hooker ordered them to charge the Confederate position. Up the mountain the cheering, eager fellows swept with irresistible valor. The Stars and Stripes was planted on the crest and 2,000 of the fleeing Confederates were made prisoners. The fog still lay heavy in the valley below, a fact which has led to the battle being called the ”Battle above the Clouds.”

DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

The following morning was also foggy, but, when it lifted, Sherman's corps was seen advancing against the Confederate right, close to Chickamauga station. In the face of a heavy artillery fire the Federals pressed on, but at the end of an hour they were compelled to retreat. By order of Grant the attack was renewed, but another severe repulse followed. Next a general movement against the left centre was ordered, and this was successful. The enemy was driven in confusion toward Ringgold, to the southeast, while a large number of prisoners and a vast amount of supplies were captured.

General Hooker pursued and drove the Confederates out of Ringgold, but they a.s.sumed so strong a position at Taylor's Ridge that Grant ordered him not to attack, but to remain and hold Ringgold, Sherman, in the meantime, marching against Longstreet. Bragg had blundered so much in conducting this disastrous campaign that President Davis was forced to replace him with Hardee.

RAISING OF THE SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

Meanwhile, Longstreet was besieging Burnside at Knoxville, where the 15,000 Union troops were threatened with starvation. The town was invested November 17th, and the next day some of the outworks were carried. Well aware that Grant, after his defeat of Bragg, would hurry to the relief of Knoxville, Longstreet attacked on the 29th, but suffered a b.l.o.o.d.y repulse. He stubbornly held his ground until he learned that Sherman was close upon him, when he withdrew and started on his march to Virginia. The campaign soon ended in Tennessee, which was virtually recovered to the Union.

The reader will note that we have described the leading events in the West and Southwest from the opening of the year to its close. Once more it is necessary to return to January, 1863, in order to give a history of the most important campaign of all--that against Richmond, which was defended by the formidable Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of General Robert E. Lee.

BURNSIDE SUPERSEDED BY HOOKER.

Burnside's management of the attack on Fredericksburg in December, 1862, was so incompetent and disastrous that it was impossible for him to retain the chief command. Knowing that several of his generals had severely criticised him, Burnside sent a list of names to Was.h.i.+ngton, giving the government the choice of removing them or accepting his resignation. Prominent on Burnside's ”black list” was the name of Hooker. On the 26th of January Burnside's resignation was accepted, and Hooker was made his successor.

The morale of the grand organization had been injured by its wretched leaders.h.i.+p, but the material itself could not have been finer. Hooker set resolutely to work, and, by the 1st of May, the army was well trained and disciplined, and numbered 130,000 men, of whom fully 12,000 were cavalry. Lee had about half as many troops.

Knowing it would not do to remain idle when the beautiful spring weather came, Hooker had been carefully planning for another campaign against Richmond. He had won a fine reputation for himself as a fighter and skillful corps commander, and the hopes were high that he would lead his superb army directly into the rebel capital. Everything seemed to be in his favor, and the campaign opened promisingly.

THE NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND.

Hooker's plan was to a.s.sail Lee at two points. The Rappahannock and Rapidan were to be crossed a short distance west of Fredericksburg, and the left wing attacked. While this was going on, Hooker's own left wing was to occupy the heights and secure possession of the Richmond Railroad. The powerful Union cavalry were to ride around Lee's position and cut off his retreat to Richmond. This involved the destruction of the railroads and bridges over the North and South Anna Rivers.

This important movement was begun April 27th. The main portion of the corps of Meade, Howard, and Sloc.u.m, numbering 36,000 men, marched thirty miles up the Rappahannock and crossed the stream without resistance. A force then moved ten miles down the other side of the river, driving away several Confederate detachments, and opened the way for Couch with 12,000 men to cross and join the other three corps. Taking different routes, the 48,000 advanced toward Chancellorsville, which had been named as the rendezvous. They were soon followed by Sickles with 18,000 men.

It was not until the Union movement had progressed thus far that Lee read its purpose. He hastily called in his divisions, and, on the forenoon of May 1st, the Army of Northern Virginia was drawn up in battle-line in front of that dense-wooded district known as the Wilderness.

Exultingly confident, Hooker ordered an advance that day from near Chancellorsville toward Fredericksburg. Hardly had he started when he learned that Lee was moving against him; he, therefore, paused and threw up defenses. His aim was to flank Lee, and, to prevent it, the Confederate commander took desperate chances. Keeping up a rattling demonstration in front he sent Stonewall Jackson with 30,000 men around the right of the Union army. Had Hooker known of this daring movement, he could easily have crushed each division in detail.