Part 16 (2/2)

If she entered another man's house, she was condemned to death as an adulteress.(336) But if she was not provided for, she might enter another man's house without blame.(337) There she might bear children. But, if so, she yet had to go back to her original husband on his return. The children she had borne in his absence were to be counted to their real father.(338) That the law provides for such cases points to the existence of frequent wars, in which fortune was not always on the side of Babylonia.

(M371) But the husband might desert his wife voluntarily. Then, if she was left unprovided for, the wife might enter another man's house. The errant husband, when he returned, could not reclaim his wife.(339)

We have a legal decision in a case(340) where a man had deserted his wife for twenty years and ”left her to her fate, did not love her.” During this time a daughter, whether real or adoptive we are not told, took care of her mother. To her the mother left property, among other things, a slave.

The mother being dead, the truant husband returned and claimed the slave from the daughter. He was nonsuited.

Among the provocations which gave the wife cause for divorce was the ”going out” of the husband, probably a euphemism for adultery on his part.

Belittling his wife was another ground for her complaint. What this means is not quite clear, but we may regard it as persistent neglect.

XII. Rights Of Widows

(M372) The Code makes clear what was the position of the widow. She had a right to stay on in her husband's house until she died,(341) but was not compelled to do so.(342) If she remained, she was the head of the family.

To her the young sons looked to furnish them with means to court a wife, and the daughters for a marriage-portion. She acted in these matters with the consent and a.s.sistance of her grown-up children. But she might elect to leave the home and remarry.

(M373) As long as she remained in her husband's home she enjoyed to the full whatever she had brought there as a marriage-portion, whatever her husband had settled upon her, and also received a share from her husband's goods at his death. The widow's share was the same as a child's. But she had no power to alienate any of these possessions. The Code expressly declares that they were her children's after her.(343) The children had no power to turn her out. If they desired her to leave, the matter came before the law-courts, and her private wishes were consulted. If she wished to remain, she might do so, and the judge bound over the children to allow her to do so.(344)

(M374) A very clear example of the permanence of the Code regulations on this subject meets us in the fifth year of Cambyses.(345) Ummu-tabat, daughter of Nabu-bel-usur, wife of Shamash-uballi?, son of Bel-ebarra, a Shamash priest, who was dead, whose sons were Shamash-e?ir, Nidittum, and Ardi-?ar, swore to Bel-uballi?, priest of Sippara, saying, ”I will not remarry, I will live with my sons, I will bring up my sons to manhood, until they are numbered with the people.” On the day that Ummu-?abat remarries, according to her bond, the property [of her late husband] which is in the possession of Bel-uballi?, the priest of Sippara, [she shall forfeit]. The tablet is defective here, but on the edge of the tablet we see that the care of her sons was given her. To remarry is expressed here by the words, ”going into the _bit zikari_.”

(M375) A widow could remarry at her discretion. She no longer had to be given in marriage. She was free to marry the man of her choice.(346) She might take with her her marriage-portion to her new home, but she had to leave behind any settlement which her former husband had given her, or any share of his goods that had come to her at his death. Her family were not called upon to find any fresh marriage-portion for her. But she was not completely mistress of even her marriage-settlement. If she had children of the former marriage, they and any children of her second marriage shared her marriage-portion equally. Only she had the enjoyment of it for life.(347) If there were no children of the second marriage, those of the first took all she left.(348)

(M376) We have a.s.sumed that when her husband died her children were old enough to care for themselves. If they were not, she had no power to enter upon a second marriage and desert her first family. She was not free to marry at all without consent of the law-court.(349) But there is no evidence that this could be withheld, if proper conditions were observed.

The first husband's property was inventoried and consent for the second marriage being granted, she and her new husband were bound by deed to preserve the whole estate of the late husband for his children. With that proviso, the newly married pair entered into full use of the deceased's property and were bound to educate the children until grown up. They had no inducement to neglect them, as in any case none of the deceased's property could ever be theirs. If the children died, it would all revert to the family of the deceased. The newly married pair had no further interest in it than the enjoyment of it until the children could manage for themselves. They could not alienate any of it. The sale of even a utensil was not possible.(350)

XIII. Obligations And Rights Of Children

(M377) It is customary to say that the father had absolute power over his children, but it is better to state only what is known with certainty regarding the extent of his power. The father could treat his child, or even his wife, equally with a slave, as a chattel to be pledged for his debts.(351) We may therefore conclude that he could sell his child. An actual example cannot be cited from early times, but they are very common later.

The son was not capable of entering into an independent contract with an outside person.(352) We may a.s.sume that this means simply while yet living in his father's house. The father had rights over what his son earned. A man could also hire out his child and take the wages.(353)

(M378) The father had the right to prefer one son above the rest. He could endow him with house, field, and garden. But this must be done in his lifetime and by written deed. This gift did not in any way affect the son's claim to inherit equally with his brethren on the father's death, when he took a full share over and above what he had by gift.(354)

(M379) The father had full power to dispose of his daughters in marriage.

But he was expected to furnish them with a marriage-portion. This was not obligatory, being probably a matter of negotiation with the parents of the bridegroom. In later times the obligation evidently became irksome and oppressive, and Law E was pa.s.sed to relieve the strain. A father was bound to do his best to fulfil his promise to dower his daughter, but no more. A father could not hinder his daughter from becoming a votary.(355) If he approved her choice, he might give her a portion, as if for marriage,(356) but he was not compelled to do so. A father could give his daughter to be a concubine.(357)

The father's consent was also needed to his son's marriage.(358) He had to provide the youth with a bride-price, and secure a wife for him.(359)

(M380) It is not easy to determine when children ceased to be under the paternal power. Betrothed daughters remained in their father's house; so did married sons sometimes. Whether the birth of a child, making the young man himself a father, freed him as head of a family, or whether it was entering a house of his own, we cannot yet say.

(M381) The Sumerian laws are very severe upon a child's repudiation of a father. That degraded him to the status of a slave. He might also be branded. Obviously he was disinherited. The repudiation is expressed in the words, ”You are not my father,” but it may be intended to cover all unfilial conduct. The Code is more explicit. If a son struck his father, his hands were cut off.(360)

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