Part 15 (1/2)
Measures were instantly taken to counteract either of these designs.
The intelligence from New York was communicated to Generals Putnam and M'Dougal, who were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march, and on the 29th of May (1779) the army moved by divisions from Middlebrook toward the Highlands. On the 30th the British army commanded by Clinton in person and convoyed by Sir George Collier proceeded up the river, and General Vaughan at the head of the largest division, landed next morning about eight miles below Verplanck's. The other division under the particular command of General Patterson, but accompanied by Clinton, advancing further up, landed on the west side within three miles of Stony Point.
That place being immediately abandoned, General Patterson took possession of it on the same afternoon. He dragged some heavy cannon and mortars to the summit of the hill in the course of the night (June 1, 1779), and at five next morning opened a battery on Fort Fayette at the distance of about 1,000 yards. During the following night two galleys pa.s.sed the fort and anchoring above it prevented the escape of the garrison by water while General Vaughan invested it closely by land.
No means of defending the fort or of saving themselves remaining the garrisons became prisoners of war. Immediate directions were given for completing the works at both posts and for putting Stony Point in particular in a strong state of defense.
Was.h.i.+ngton determined to check any further advance of the enemy, and before Clinton was in a situation to proceed against West Point, General M'Dougal was so strengthened and the American army took such a position on the strong grounds about the Hudson that the enterprise became too hazardous to be further prosecuted.
After completing the fortifications on both sides of the river at King's Ferry, Clinton placed a strong garrison in each fort and proceeded down the river to Philipsburg. The relative situation of the hostile armies presenting insuperable obstacles to any grand operation they could be employed offensively only on detached expeditions. Connecticut, from its contiguity to New York and its extent of sea coast, was peculiarly exposed to invasion. The numerous small cruisers which plied in the sound, to the great annoyance of British commerce, and the large supplies of provisions drawn from the adjacent country for the use of the Continental army, furnished great inducements to Clinton to direct his enterprises particularly against that State. He also hoped to draw Was.h.i.+ngton from his impregnable position on the North river into the low country and thus obtain an opportunity of striking at some part of his army or of seizing the posts which were the great object of the campaign. With these views he planned an expedition against Connecticut, the command of which was given to Governor Tryon, who reached New Haven bay on the 5th of July (1779) with about 2,600 men.
Was.h.i.+ngton was at the time on the lines examining in person the condition of the works on Stony and Verplanck's Points, in consequence of which the intelligence which was transmitted to headquarters that the fleet had sailed could not be immediately communicated to the Governor of Connecticut, and the first intimation which that State received of its danger was given by the appearance of the enemy. The militia a.s.sembled in considerable numbers with alacrity, but the British effected a landing and took possession of the town. After destroying the military and naval stores found in the place, they re-embarked and proceeded westward to Fairfield which was reduced to ashes. The spirited resistance made by the militia at this place is attested by the apology made by General Tryon for the wanton destruction of private property which disgraced his conduct. ”The village was burnt,” he says, ”to resent the fire of the rebels from their houses and to mask our retreat.”
From Fairfield the fleet crossed the sound to Huntington bay where it remained until the 9th (July, 1779), when it recrossed that water. The troops were landed in the night on a peninsula on the east side of the Bay of Norwalk. About the same time a much larger detachment from the British army directed its course towards Horse Neck and made demonstrations of a design to penetrate into the country in that direction.
On the first intelligence that Connecticut was invaded, General Parsons, a native of that State, had been directed by Was.h.i.+ngton to hasten to the scene of action. Placing himself at the head of about 150 Continental troops who were supported by considerable bodies of militia, he attacked the British on the morning of the twelfth as soon as they were in motion and kept up an irregular distant fire throughout the day. But, being too weak to prevent the destruction of any particular town on the coast, Norwalk was reduced to ashes, after which the British re-embarked and returned to Huntington bay there to await for reinforcements. At this place, however, Tryon received orders to return to Whitestone where in a conference between Clinton and Sir George Collier it was determined to proceed against New London with an increased force.
On the invasion of Connecticut, Was.h.i.+ngton was prompt in his exertions to send Continental troops from the nearest encampments to its aid, but before they could afford any real service Clinton found it necessary to recall Tryon to the Hudson.
Was.h.i.+ngton had planned an enterprise against the posts at King's Ferry, comprehending a double attack to be made at the same time on both. But the difficulty of a perfect cooperation of detachments, incapable of communicating with each other, determined him to postpone the attack on Verplanck's and to make that part of the plan dependent on the success of the first. His whole attention, therefore, was turned to Stony Point and the troops destined for this critical service proceeded on it as against a single object.
The execution of the plan was entrusted by Was.h.i.+ngton to General Wayne who commanded the light infantry of the army. His daring courage had long since obtained for him the sobriquet of ”Mad Anthony.” He accepted the command with alacrity. Secrecy was deemed so much more essential to success than numbers that no addition was made to the force already on the lines. One brigade was ordered to commence its march so as to reach the scene of action in time to cover the troops engaged in the attack should any unlooked-for disaster befall them, and Maj. Henry Lee of the light dragoons, who had been eminently useful in obtaining the intelligence which led to the enterprise, was a.s.sociated with Wayne as far as cavalry could be employed in such a service. The night of the 15th (July, 1779), and the hour of twelve, were chosen for the a.s.sault.
Stony Point is a commanding hill projecting far into the Hudson which washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth was in a great measure covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river on the upper side and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there was only one crossing place, but at its junction with the river was a sandy beach pa.s.sable at low tide. On the summit of this hill stood the fort which was furnished with heavy ordnance. Several breastworks and strong batteries were advanced in front of the main work, and about half way down the hill were two rows of abattis. The batteries were calculated to command the beach and the crossing place of the marsh, and to rake and enfilade any column which might be advancing from either of those points toward the fort. In addition to these defenses several vessels of war were stationed in the river and commanded the ground at the foot of the hill. The garrison consisted of about 600 men commanded by Colonel Johnson.
Wayne arrived about eight in the evening at Springsteel's, one and a half miles from the fort and made his dispositions for the a.s.sault.
It was intended to attack the works on the right and left flanks at the same instant. The regiments of Febiger and of Meigs with Major Hull's detachment formed the right column, and Butler's regiment, with two companies under Major Murfree, formed the left. One hundred and fifty volunteers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Posey const.i.tuted the van of the right, and 100 volunteers under Major Stewart composed the van of the left. At 11:30 the two columns moved to the a.s.sault, the van of each with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets. They were each preceded by a forlorn hope of twenty men, the one commanded by Lieutenant Gibbon and the other by Lieutenant Knox. They reached the marsh undiscovered and at 12:20 commenced the a.s.sault.
Both columns rushed forward under a tremendous fire of grape-shot and musketry. Surmounting every obstacle, they entered the works at the point of the bayonet and without discharging a single musket obtained possession of the fort.
The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous nor less honorable than their courage. Not an individual suffered after resistance had ceased.
All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree of ardor and impetuosity which proved them to be capable of the most difficult enterprises, and all distinguished themselves whose situation enabled them to do so. Colonel Fleury, who had distinguished himself in defense of the forts on the Delaware in 1777, was the first to enter the fort and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted the works almost at the same instant and was the first to give the watch-word, ”The fort's our own.” Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed the service allotted to them with a degree of intrepidity which could not be surpa.s.sed. Of twenty men who const.i.tuted the party of the former, seventeen were killed or wounded. [1] Sixty-three of the garrison were killed, including two officers. The prisoners amounted to 543, among whom were 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 captains, and 20 subaltern officers.
The military stores taken in the fort were considerable.
The loss sustained by the a.s.sailants was not proportioned to the apparent danger of the enterprise. The killed and wounded did not exceed 100 men. Wayne, who marched with Febiger's regiment in the right column received a wound in the head which stunned him. Recovering consciousness, but believing the wound to be mortal, he said to his aids, ”Carry me into the fort and let me die at the head of my column.”
Being supported by his aids he entered the fort with the regiment.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hay was also among the wounded.
Although the design upon Fort Fayette had yielded to the desire of securing the success of the attack on Stony Point it had not been abandoned. Two brigades under General M'Dougal had been ordered to approach the works on Verplanck's, in which Colonel Webster commanded, and be in readiness to attack them the instant Wayne should obtain possession of Stony Point. That this detachment might not permit the favorable moment to pa.s.s unimproved Wayne had been requested to direct the messenger who should convey the intelligence of his success to Was.h.i.+ngton to pa.s.s through M'Dougal's camp and give him advice of that event. He was also requested to turn the cannon of the fort against Verplanck's and the vessels in the river. The last orders were executed and a heavy cannonade was opened on Fort Fayette and on the vessels, which compelled them to fall down the river. Through some misconception, never explained, the messenger dispatched by Wayne did not call on M'Dougal, but proceeded directly to headquarters. Thus, every advantage expected from the first impression made by the capture of Stony Point was lost, and the garrison had full leisure to recover from the surprise occasioned by that event and to prepare for an attack. This change of circ.u.mstances made it necessary to change the plan of operation.
Was.h.i.+ngton ordered General Howe to take the command of M'Dougal's detachment to which some pieces of heavy artillery were to be annexed.
He was directed, after effecting a breach in the walls, to make the dispositions for an a.s.sault and to demand a surrender, but not to attempt a storm until it should be dark. To these orders explicit instructions were added not to hazard his party by remaining before Verplanck's after the British should cross Croton river in force.
Through some unaccountable negligence in the persons charged with the execution of these orders the battering artillery was not accompanied with suitable ammunition, and the necessary entrenching tools were not brought. These omissions were supplied the next day, but it was then too late to proceed against Verplanck's.
On receiving intelligence of the loss of Stony Point and of the danger to which the garrison of Fort Fayette was exposed, Sir Henry Clinton relinquished his views on Connecticut and made a forced march to Dobb's Ferry. Some troops were immediately embarked to pa.s.s up the river and a light corps was pushed forward to the Croton. This movement relieved Fort Fayette.
The failure of the attempt to obtain possession of Verplanck's Point, leaving that road of communication still closed, diminished the advantages which had been expected to result from the enterprise so much that it was deemed unadvisable to maintain Stony Point. On reconnoitering the ground Was.h.i.+ngton believed that the place could not be rendered secure with a garrison of less than 1,500 men--a number which could not be spared from the army without weakening it too much for further operations. He determined, therefore, to evacuate Stony Point and retire to the Highlands. As soon as this resolution was executed Clinton repossessed himself of that post, repaired the fortifications, and placed a stronger garrison in it, after which he resumed his former situation at Philipsburg.
The two armies watched each other for some time. At length, Clinton, finding himself unable to attack Was.h.i.+ngton in the strong position he had taken or to draw him from it, and being desirous of transferring the theater of active war to the south, withdrew to New York and was understood to be strengthening the fortifications erected for its defense, as preparatory to the large detachments he intended making to reinforce the southern army.
Although this movement was made princ.i.p.ally with a view to southern operations, it was in some degree hastened by the opinion that New York required immediate additional protection during the absence of the fleet, which was about to sail for the relief of Pen.o.bscot.