Part 24 (1/2)
The people and their rulers talked loudly of liberty, but each was anxious to sacrifice as little as possible to maintain it and to devolve on his neighbor the expense, dangers, and privations of the struggle.
In consequence of this dilatory spirit, when the troops left their winter quarters in the month of June (1781), and encamped at Peekskill, the army under Was.h.i.+ngton did not amount to 5,000 men. This force was so much inferior to what had been contemplated when the plan of operations was agreed on at Wethersfield that it became doubtful whether it would be expedient to adhere to that plan. But the deficiency of the American force was in some measure compensated by the arrival at Boston of a reinforcement of 1,500 men to the army under Rochambeau.
The hope of terminating the war in the course of the campaign encouraged the States to make some exertions. Small as was their military force it was difficult to find subsistence for the troops, and even after the army had taken the field there was reason to apprehend that it would be obliged to abandon the objects of the campaign for want of provisions.
It was at that critical juncture of American affairs that the finances of the Union were entrusted to Robert Morris, a member of Congress for Pennsylvania, a man of considerable capital and of much sagacity and mercantile enterprise. He, as we have already seen, extensively pledged his personal credit for articles of the first necessity to the army, and, by an honorable fulfillment of his engagements, did much to restore public credit and confidence. It was owing mainly to his exertions that the active and decisive operations of the campaign were not greatly impeded or entirely defeated by want of subsistence to the army and of the means of transporting military stores.
By his plan of a national bank, already referred to, Mr. Morris rendered still more important service. Its notes were to be received as cash into the treasuries of the several States, and also as an equivalent for the necessaries which the States were bound to provide for the army. In this way, and by a liberal and judicious application of his own resources, an individual afforded the supplies which government was unable to furnish.
The French troops, under Rochambeau, marched from Newport and Boston toward the Hudson. Both in quarters and on the route their behavior was exemplary, and gained the respect and good will of the inhabitants.
Toward the end of June (1781) Was.h.i.+ngton put his army in motion, and, learning that a royal detachment had pa.s.sed into the Jerseys, he formed a plan to surprise the British posts on the north end of York Island, but it did not succeed, and General Lincoln, who commanded the Americans, being attacked by a strong British party, a sharp conflict ensued. Was.h.i.+ngton marched with his main body to support his detachment, but on his advance the British retired into their works at Kingsbridge.
Rochambeau, then on his march to join Was.h.i.+ngton, detached the Duke de Lauzun with a body of men to support the attack, who advanced with his troops within supporting distance, but the British had retreated before they could be brought into action.
Having failed in his design of surprising the British posts Was.h.i.+ngton withdrew to Valentine's Hill, and afterward to Dobb's Ferry. While encamped there, on the 6th of July (1781), the van of the long-expected French reinforcements under Rochambeau was seen winding down the neighboring heights. The arrival of these friendly strangers elevated the minds of the Americans, who received them with sincere congratulations. Was.h.i.+ngton labored, by personal attentions, to conciliate the good will of his allies, and used all the means in his power to prevent those mutual jealousies and irritations which frequently prevail between troops of different nations serving in the same army. An attack on New York was still meditated, and every exertion made to prepare for its execution, but with the determination, if it should prove impracticable, vigorously to prosecute some more attainable object. [1]
On the evening of the 21st of July (1781), the greater part of the American, and part of the French troops, left their encampment, and marching rapidly during the night, appeared in order of battle before the British works at Kingsbridge, at 4 next morning. Was.h.i.+ngton and Rochambeau, with the general officers and engineers, viewed the British lines in their whole extent from right to left, and the same was again done next morning. But, on the afternoon of the 23d they returned to their former encampment without having made any attempt on the British works.
At that time the new levies arrived slowly in the American camp, and many of those who were sent were mere boys utterly unfit for active service. The several States discovered much backwardness in complying with the requisitions of Congress, so that there was reason to apprehend that the number of troops necessary for besieging New York could not be procured. This made Was.h.i.+ngton turn his thoughts more seriously to the southward than he had hitherto done, but all his movements confirmed Clinton in the belief that an attack on New York was in contemplation.
As the British Commander-in-Chief, however, at that time received about 3,000 troops from Europe, he thought himself able to defend his post without withdrawing any part of the force from Virginia. Therefore he countermanded the requisition which he had before sent to Cornwallis for part of the troops under his command. The troops were embarked before the arrival of the counter order, and of their embarkation Lafayette sent notice to Was.h.i.+ngton. On the reception of new instructions, however, as formerly mentioned they were relanded and remained in Virginia.
No great operation could be undertaken against the British armies so long as their navy had undisputed command of the coast and of the great navigable rivers. Was.h.i.+ngton, as we have seen, had already, through Colonel Laurens, made an earnest application to the court of France for such a fleet as might be capable of keeping in check the British navy in those seas and of affording effectual a.s.sistance to the land forces.
That application was not unsuccessful, and towards the middle of the month of August the agreeable information was received of the approach of a powerful French fleet to the American coast.
Early in March (1781) the Count de Gra.s.se had sailed from Brest with twenty-five s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, five of which were destined for the East, and twenty for the West Indies. After an indecisive encounter in the Straits of St. Lucie with Sir Samuel Hood, whom Sir George Rodney, the British admiral in the West Indies had detached to intercept him, Count de Gra.s.se formed a junction with the s.h.i.+ps of his sovereign on that station and had a fleet superior to that of the British in the West Indies. De Gra.s.se gave the Americans notice that he would visit their coast in the month of August and take his station in Chesapeake Bay, but that his continuance there could only be of short duration. This dispatch at once determined Was.h.i.+ngton's resolution with respect to the main point of attack, and as it was necessary that the projected operation should be accomplished within a very limited time prompt decision and indefatigable exertion were indispensable. Though it was now finally resolved that Virginia should be the grand scene of action, yet it was prudent to conceal till the last moment this determination from Sir Henry Clinton, and still to maintain the appearance of threatening New York.
The defense of the strong posts on the Hudson or North river was entrusted to General Heath who was instructed to protect the adjacent country as far as he was able, and for that purpose a respectable force was put under his command. Every preparation of which circ.u.mstances admitted was made to facilitate the march to the southward. Was.h.i.+ngton was to take the command of the expedition and to employ in it all the French troops and a strong detachment of the American army.
On the 19th of August (1781) a considerable corps was ordered to cross the Hudson at Dobbs' Ferry and to take a position between Springfield and Chatham, where they were directed to cover some bakehouses which it was rumored were to be immediately constructed in the vicinity of those places in order to encourage the belief that there the troops intended to establish a permanent post. On the 20th and 21st the main body of the Americans pa.s.sed the river at King's ferry, but the French made a longer circuit and did not complete the pa.s.sage till the 25th. Desirous of concealing his object as long as possible, Was.h.i.+ngton continued his march some time in such a direction as still to keep up the appearance of threatening New York. When concealment was no longer practicable he marched southward with the utmost celerity. His movements had been of such a doubtful nature that Sir Henry Clinton, it is said, was not fully convinced of his real destination till he had crossed the Delaware.
Great exertions had been made to procure funds for putting the army in motion, but, after exhausting every other resource, Was.h.i.+ngton was obliged to have recourse to Rochambeau for a supply of cash, which he received. [2]
On the 2d and 3d of September (1781) the combined American and French armies pa.s.sed through Philadelphia, where they were received with ringing of bells, firing of guns, bonfires, illuminations, and every demonstration of joy. Meanwhile Count de Gra.s.se, with 3,000 troops on board, sailed from Cape Francois with a valuable fleet of merchantmen, which he conducted out of danger, and then steered for Chesapeake Bay with twenty-eight sail-of-the-line and several frigates. Toward the end of August (1781) he cast anchor just within the capes, extending across from Cape Henry to the middle ground. There an officer from Lafayette waited on the count, and gave him full information concerning the posture of affairs in Virginia, and the intended plan of operations against the British army in that State.
Cornwallis was diligently fortifying himself at York and Gloucester.
Lafayette was in a position on James river to prevent his escape into North Carolina, and the combined army was hastening southward to attack him. In order to cooperate against Cornwallis De Gra.s.se detached four s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line and some frigates to block up the entrance of York river, and to carry the land forces which he had brought with him, under the Marquis de St. Simon, to Lafayette's camp. The rest of his fleet remained at the entrance of the bay.
Sir George Rodney, who commanded the British fleet in the West Indies, was not ignorant that the count intended to sail for America, but knowing that the merchant vessel which he convoyed from Cape Francois were loaded with valuable cargoes the British admiral believed that he would send the greater part of his fleet along with them to Europe and would visit the American coast with a small squadron only.
Accordingly, Rodney detached Sir Samuel Hood with fourteen sail-of-the-line to America as a sufficient force to counteract the operations of the French in that quarter. Admiral Hood reached the capes of Virginia on the 25th of August (1781), a few days before de Gra.s.se entered the bay and finding no enemy there sailed for Sandy Hook, where he arrived on the 28th of August.
Admiral Graves, who had succeeded Admiral Arbuthnot in the command of the British fleet on the American station, was then lying at New York with seven sail-of-the-line; but two of his s.h.i.+ps had been damaged in a cruise near Boston and were under repair. At the same time that Admiral Hood gave information of the expected arrival of de Gra.s.se on the American coast, notice was received of the sailing of de Barras with his fleet from Newport. Admiral Graves, therefore, without waiting for his two s.h.i.+ps which were under repair, put to sea on the 31st of August with nineteen sail-of-the-line and steered to the southward.
On reaching the capes of the Chesapeake, early on the morning of the 5th of September (1781), he discovered the French fleet, consisting of twenty-four s.h.i.+ps-of-the-line, lying at anchor in the entrance of the bay. Neither admiral had any previous knowledge of the vicinity of the other till the fleets were actually seen. The British stretched into the bay and soon as Count de Gra.s.se ascertained their hostile character he ordered his s.h.i.+ps to slip their cables, form the line as they could come up without regard to their specified stations and put to sea. The British fleet entering the bay and the French leaving it, they were necessarily sailing in different directions, but Admiral Graves put his s.h.i.+ps on the same tack with the French and about four in the afternoon a battle began between the van and centre of the fleets which continued till night. Both sustained considerable damage. The fleets continued in sight of each other for five days, but de Gra.s.se's object was not to fight unless to cover Chesapeake Bay, and Admiral Graves, owing to the inferiority of his force and the crippled state of several of his s.h.i.+ps, was unable to compel him to renew the engagement.
On the 10th (September, 1781), de Gra.s.se bore away for the Chesapeake and anch.o.r.ed within the capes next day when he had the satisfaction to find that Admiral de Barras with his fleet from Newport and fourteen transports laden with heavy artillery and other military stores for carrying on a siege had safely arrived during his absence. That officer sailed from Newport on the 25th of August, and making a long circuit to avoid the British, entered the bay while the contending fleets were at sea. Admiral Graves followed the French fleet to the Chesapeake, but on arriving there he found the entrance guarded by a force with which he was unable to contend. He then sailed for New York and left de Gra.s.se in the undisputed possession of the bay.
While these naval operations were going on the land forces were not less actively employed in the prosecution of their respective purposes. The immediate aim of Was.h.i.+ngton was to overwhelm Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown; that of Clinton, to rescue him from his grasp. As soon as Clinton was convinced of Was.h.i.+ngton's intention of proceeding to the southward with a view to bring him back, he employed the infamous traitor Arnold, with a sufficient naval and military force, on an expedition against New London. The ”parricide,” as Jefferson calls him, had not the slightest objection to fill his pockets with the plunder of his native State. He pa.s.sed from Long Island and on the forenoon of the 6th of September (1781) landed his troops on both sides of the harbor; those on the New London side being under his own immediate orders and those on the Groton side commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre. As the works at New London were very imperfect, no vigorous resistance was there made, and the place was taken possession of with little loss. But Fort Griswold, on the Groton side, was in a more finished state and the small garrison made a desperate defense. The British entered the fort at the point of the bayonet.
Col. William Ledyard, brother of the celebrated traveler, commanded the fort. Colonel Eyre and Major Montgomery having fallen in the a.s.sault, the command had devolved on Major Bromfield, a New Jersey Tory. After the works had been carried, Ledyard ordered his men to lay down their arms. Bromfield called out, ”Who commands in this fort?” Ledyard advanced and presenting his sword, replied, ”I did, but you do now.”
Bromfield seized the sword and ran Ledyard through the body. This was the signal for an indiscriminate ma.s.sacre of a greater part of the garrison by the Tories, refugees, and Hessians, of which the army of Arnold was very appropriately composed. Seventy were killed and thirty-five desperately wounded. The enemy lost 2 officers and 46 men killed, 8 officers and 135 soldiers wounded. Few Americans had fallen before the British entered the works.