Part I (Prima Pars) Part 26 (1/2)

as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that ”whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower.” Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in G.o.d's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in _Phys._ iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in G.o.d's knowledge, which is infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of G.o.d is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), ”Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds.”

_I answer that,_ Since G.o.d knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A.

9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that G.o.d knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For G.o.d knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is partic.i.p.able by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of G.o.d extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.

Reply Obj. 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quant.i.ty, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quant.i.ty implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quant.i.ty of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But G.o.d does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.

Reply Obj. 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of G.o.d as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of G.o.d is the measure of things, not quant.i.tatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.

For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of G.o.d, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quant.i.ty, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of G.o.d.

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THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 13]

Whether the Knowledge of G.o.d Is of Future Contingent Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of G.o.d is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things known, as said above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of G.o.d is not of contingent things.

Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true conditional proposition, ”If G.o.d knew that this thing will be, it will be,” for the knowledge of G.o.d is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever G.o.d knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of G.o.d is not of contingent things.

Obj. 3: Further, everything known by G.o.d must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of G.o.d is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), ”He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,” i.e.

of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore G.o.d knows future contingent things.

_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), G.o.d knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that G.o.d knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now G.o.d knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless G.o.d knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to G.o.d from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.

Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by G.o.d, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by G.o.d are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of G.o.d, which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, ”G.o.d knew this contingent to be future,” is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, ”Socrates is a white man.”

But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, ”G.o.d knew this contingent to be future,” contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an a.s.s, as that I said Socrates runs, or G.o.d is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.

But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, ”if the sun moves, the gra.s.s will grow.”

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, ”What the soul understands is immaterial,” this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.

Likewise if I say, ”If G.o.d knew anything, it will be,” the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: ”For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be,” as the Philosopher says in _Peri Herm._ i.

Reply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by G.o.d (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to G.o.d alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by G.o.d must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.

Hence also this proposition, ”Everything known by G.o.d must necessarily be,” is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, ”Everything which G.o.d knows is necessary.”