Part I (Prima Pars) Part 26 (2/2)
If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, ”This proposition, 'that which is known by G.o.d is' is necessary.”
Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, ”It is possible for a white thing to be black,” it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, ”a white thing is black” can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, ”A black crow can be white”; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by G.o.d is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by G.o.d cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words ”that which is known” implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
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FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]
Whether G.o.d Knows Enunciable Things?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.
Therefore G.o.d does not know enunciable things.
Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in G.o.d there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore G.o.d does not know enunciable things.
_On the contrary,_ It is written: ”The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men”
(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore G.o.d knows enunciable things.
_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since G.o.d knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity that G.o.d knows all enunciations that can be formed.
Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is G.o.d's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, G.o.d knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.
Reply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if G.o.d knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.
Reply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus G.o.d by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
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FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 15]
Whether the Knowledge of G.o.d Is Variable?
Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of G.o.d is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to G.o.d from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of G.o.d is variable according to the variation of creatures.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever G.o.d can make, He can know. But G.o.d can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore G.o.d does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of G.o.d is variable.
_On the contrary,_ It is said, that in G.o.d ”there is no change nor shadow of alteration” (James 1:17).
_I answer that,_ Since the knowledge of G.o.d is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 1), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
Reply Obj. 1: ”Lord”, ”Creator” and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of G.o.d imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in G.o.d; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in G.o.d in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that ”Lord”, ”Creator” and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to G.o.d variously, according to the variation of creatures.
But ”knowledge” and ”love,” and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in G.o.d; and therefore these are predicated of G.o.d in an invariable manner.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d knows also what He can make, and does not make.
Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which G.o.d did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by G.o.d in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by G.o.d from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that G.o.d can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.
Reply Obj. 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say ”Christ is born” and ”will be born” and ”was born”; because the same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever G.o.d knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, ”Socrates sits,” is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, ”Whatever G.o.d knew He knows,” if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of G.o.d is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that G.o.d knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that G.o.d knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of G.o.d, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in G.o.d.
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