Part I (Prima Pars) Part 33 (2/2)

Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of G.o.d is necessary, for G.o.d is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown (Q. 2, A. 3). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in G.o.d there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in _Metaph._ v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, G.o.d does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Obj. 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]

says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of G.o.d is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Obj. 6: Further, whatever G.o.d knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever G.o.d wills, He wills necessarily.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): ”Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore G.o.d does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

_I answer that,_ There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting.

Accordingly as to things willed by G.o.d, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence G.o.d wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and princ.i.p.al object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But G.o.d wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take s.h.i.+p in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of G.o.d is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that G.o.d wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.

Reply Obj. 2: Although G.o.d necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not natural to G.o.d to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that G.o.d does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of G.o.d can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

Reply Obj. 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

Reply Obj. 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in G.o.d; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that G.o.d knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 4]

Whether the Will of G.o.d Is the Cause of Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of G.o.d is not the cause of things.

For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): ”As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can partic.i.p.ate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists.” But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore G.o.d does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But G.o.d is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being _such_ a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), ”Because G.o.d is good, we exist.” Therefore G.o.d is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.

Obj. 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the [cause of]

created things is the knowledge of G.o.d, as said before (Q. 14, A. 8).

Therefore the will of G.o.d cannot be considered the cause of things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:26), ”How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?”

_I answer that,_ We must hold that the will of G.o.d is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.

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