Part I (Prima Pars) Part 35 (1/2)
_On the contrary,_ All good things that exist G.o.d wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
_I answer that,_ The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to a.s.sign to intermediate causes, holding that what G.o.d produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.
This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder G.o.d's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which G.o.d wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now G.o.d wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by G.o.d happen contingently, but because G.o.d prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.
Reply Obj. 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by G.o.d that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if G.o.d wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that G.o.d wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.
Reply Obj. 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that G.o.d wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.
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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]
Whether G.o.d Wills Evils?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d wills evils. For every good that exists, G.o.d wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): ”Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things.” Therefore G.o.d wills evil things.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): ”Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything,” i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10, 11): ”Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.” But G.o.d wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what G.o.d desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore G.o.d wills evil.
Obj. 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But G.o.d does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, G.o.d's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore G.o.d wills that evil should exist.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): ”No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now G.o.d surpa.s.ses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is G.o.d the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.” Therefore it is not by G.o.d's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore G.o.d wills not evil things.
_I answer that,_ Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (Q. 5, A. 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appet.i.te, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appet.i.te which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appet.i.tes. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.
Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now G.o.d wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.
Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.
Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that although G.o.d does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words ”that evil should be or be done.” This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should s.h.i.+ne forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
Reply Obj. 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that ”evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe,” draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
Reply Obj. 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. G.o.d therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.
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TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 10]
Whether G.o.d Has Free-Will?
Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; ”G.o.d alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side.”
Obj. 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But G.o.d does not will evil, as has been said (A. 9). Therefore there is not free-will in G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): ”The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.”
_I answer that,_ We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor by natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then G.o.d necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (A. 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
Reply Obj. 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to G.o.d not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.