Part I (Prima Pars) Part 36 (1/2)

G.o.d'S LOVE (In Four Articles)

We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of G.o.d. In the appet.i.tive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the pa.s.sions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fort.i.tude and the like.

Hence we shall first consider the love of G.o.d, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love exists in G.o.d?

(2) Whether He loves all things?

(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?

(4) Whether He loves more the better things?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 1]

Whether Love Exists in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in G.o.d. For in G.o.d there are no pa.s.sions. Now love is a pa.s.sion. Therefore love is not in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to G.o.d, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.

Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): ”Love is a uniting and binding force.” But this cannot take place in G.o.d, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: ”G.o.d is love” (John 4:16).

_I answer that,_ We must needs a.s.sert that in G.o.d there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appet.i.tive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appet.i.tive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appet.i.te, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appet.i.te that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appet.i.te that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appet.i.te; for which reason all the other appet.i.te movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For n.o.body desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appet.i.te, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in G.o.d (Q. 19, A.

1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.

Reply Obj. 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appet.i.tive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 58, 75, so in ourselves the intellectual appet.i.te, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appet.i.te. Hence, in us the sensitive appet.i.te is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appet.i.te, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals.

Therefore acts of the sensitive appet.i.te, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called pa.s.sions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are pa.s.sions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appet.i.te, they are not pa.s.sions. It is in this latter sense that they are in G.o.d. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): ”G.o.d rejoices by an operation that is one and simple,” and for the same reason He loves without pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: In the pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te there may be distinguished a certain material element--namely, the bodily change--and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appet.i.te. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15, 63, 64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appet.i.te for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain pa.s.sions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other pa.s.sions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to G.o.d on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (Q. 3, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 19, A. 11). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of G.o.d, though without attributing pa.s.sion to Him, as said before (Q. 19, A. 11).

Reply Obj. 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in G.o.d, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown (Q. 6, AA. 1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as G.o.d wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in G.o.d.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 2]

Whether G.o.d Loves All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pa.s.s, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that G.o.d is placed outside of Himself, and pa.s.ses into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that G.o.d loves things other than Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, the love of G.o.d is eternal. But things apart from G.o.d are not from eternity; except in G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore G.o.d does not love things other than Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friends.h.i.+p. Now G.o.d does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.

Nor with the love of friends.h.i.+p; since there can be no friends.h.i.+p with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).

Therefore G.o.d does not love all things.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): ”Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.” Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore G.o.d does not love all things.