Part I (Prima Pars) Part 75 (1/2)

Obj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): ”In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth.”

_I answer that,_ The words of Genesis, ”In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth,” are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words ”In the beginning” are expounded--viz. ”of time.” And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which ”In the beginning” is expounded--”in the Son.” For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), ”Thou hast made all things in wisdom,” it may be understood that G.o.d made all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), ”In Him”--viz. the Son--”were created all things.” But others said that corporeal things were created by G.o.d through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: ”In the beginning”--i.e. before all things--”G.o.d created heaven and earth.” For four things are stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created.

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood ”of being made” by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since in every movement there is ”before” and ”after,” before any one point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a ”before” and also an ”after,”

because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in ”being moved.” But creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said above (Q. 45, AA. 2, 3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except ”now.” Hence time cannot be made except according to some ”now”; not because in the first ”now” is time, but because from it time begins.

_______________________

QUESTION 47

OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (In Three Articles)

After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold--first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.

Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) The mult.i.tude or distinction of things.

(2) Their inequality.

(3) The unity of the world.

_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 1]

Whether the Mult.i.tude and Distinction of Things Come from G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mult.i.tude and distinction of things does not come from G.o.d. For one naturally always makes one.

But G.o.d is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A.

4). Therefore He produces but one effect.

Obj. 2: Further, the representation is a.s.similated to its exemplar.

But G.o.d is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q.

44, A. 3). Therefore, as G.o.d is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.

Obj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above (Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of G.o.d is but one.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that G.o.d ”divided the light from the darkness,” and ”divided waters from waters.” Therefore the distinction and mult.i.tude of things is from G.o.d.

_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.

Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and mult.i.tude of things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter.

But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above (Q. 44, A. 2), even matter itself was created by G.o.d. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.

Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.