Part I (Prima Pars) Part 76 (1/2)
But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say ”man” I mean the form, and when I say ”this man,” I mean the form in matter; so when we say ”world,” the form is signified, and when we say ”this world,” the form in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 1:10): ”The world was made by Him,” where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
_I answer that,_ The very order of things created by G.o.d shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from G.o.d, have relation of order to each other, and to G.o.d Himself, as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3; Q. 21, A. 1). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can a.s.sert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.
Reply Obj. 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of G.o.d governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
Reply Obj. 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material mult.i.tude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end.
Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three; and so on to infinite.
Reply Obj. 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.
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QUESTION 48
THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (In Six Articles)
We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.
Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.
Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:
(1) Whether evil is a nature?
(2) Whether evil is found in things?
(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?
(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?
(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.
(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 1]
Whether Evil Is a Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that ”good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things.” Therefore evil is a nature.
Obj. 2: Further, every difference which const.i.tutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference const.i.tuting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Obj. 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Obj. 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
Obj. 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir.