Part I (Prima Pars) Part 77 (1/2)

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject.

For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that ”evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists.”

Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.

Obj. 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But ”non-being” does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.

Obj. 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Isa. 5:20): ”Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!”

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that ”evil exists only in good.”

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz.

being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality.

Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.

Reply Obj. 2: ”Not-being,” understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such ”not-being” is an evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not ”sight,” but ”animal.” Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.

Reply Obj. 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 4]

Whether Evil Corrupts the Whole Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that ”evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good.” But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.

Obj. 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that ”evil cannot wholly consume good.”

_I answer that,_ Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the apt.i.tude of a subject to some actuality.

The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quant.i.ty, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity.

For this kind of apt.i.tude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.

Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid apt.i.tude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and pa.s.sive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the apt.i.tude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid apt.i.tude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the apt.i.tude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the apt.i.tude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and G.o.d, according to Isa. 59:2: ”Our sins have divided between us and G.o.d.” Yet the aforesaid apt.i.tude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.

Reply Obj. 2: The aforesaid apt.i.tude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.