Part I (Prima Pars) Part 84 (1/2)

Obj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.

Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands.

_On the contrary,_ The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its substance, for this belongs to G.o.d only, as is evident from what was said above (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality.

But G.o.d alone is pure act. Hence only in G.o.d is His substance the same as His existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.

Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from G.o.d's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse partic.i.p.ation of the act of understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the pa.s.sive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation between ”life” and ”to live” is not the same as that between ”essence” and ”to be”; but rather as that between ”a race” and ”to run,” one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if ”to live” is ”to be,” that ”life” is ”essence.” Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), ”Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life”: yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that ”the act of the intellect is life.”

Reply Obj. 3: The action which is transient, pa.s.sing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both.

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 2]

Whether in the Angel to Understand Is to Exist?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37). But to ”understand is in a sense to live”

(De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

Obj. 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

_On the contrary,_ The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.

_I answer that,_ The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.

16), there is a twofold cla.s.s of action; one which pa.s.ses out to something beyond, and causes pa.s.sion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pa.s.s outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.

It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act ”to understand,” of which the object is ”the true”; and the act ”to will,” of which the object is ”the good”; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; G.o.d's being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will.

Reply Obj. 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.

Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel ”to be” is the same as 'to understand.'

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel's Power of Intelligence Is His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, ”mind” and ”intellect” express the power of understanding. But in many pa.s.sages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels ”intellects” and ”minds.”

Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.