Part I (Prima Pars) Part 84 (2/2)
Obj. 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But ”a simple form cannot be a subject,” as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said (Q. 50, A. 2).
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that G.o.d made the angelic nature ”nigh unto Himself,” while He made primary matter ”nigh unto nothing”; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to G.o.d. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that ”the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation.” Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
_I answer that,_ Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said (Q. 44, A. 1). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.
Reply Obj. 1: An angel is called ”intellect” and ”mind,” because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
Reply Obj. 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. G.o.d alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.
Reply Obj. 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 4]
Whether There Is an Active and a Pa.s.sive Intellect in an Angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a pa.s.sive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, ”in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things.” But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a pa.s.sive intellect in an angel.
Obj. 2: Further, the proper function of the pa.s.sive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in _De Anima_ iii, text. 2, 3, 18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a pa.s.sive intellect.
_On the contrary,_ The distinction of active and pa.s.sive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the pa.s.sive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from _De Anima_ iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and pa.s.sive intellect in the angel.
_I answer that,_ The necessity for admitting a pa.s.sive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the pa.s.sive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect.
But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and princ.i.p.ally understand immaterial things, as will appear later (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1). Therefore there cannot be an active and a pa.s.sive intellect in them, except equivocally.
Reply Obj. 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is no need for admitting an active and a pa.s.sive intellect in them.
Reply Obj. 2: It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the pa.s.sive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the pa.s.sive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and pa.s.sive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 5]
Whether There Is Only Intellectual Knowledge in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is ”life which understands and feels.” Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.
Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many remembrances, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.
Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of ”perverted phantasy” in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that ”man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels.”
_I answer that,_ In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Q. 51, A. 1).
Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.
The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul.
For this reason the angels are called ”intellects” and ”minds,” as was said above (A. 3, ad 1).
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