Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 39 (1/2)
ii) Hierotheus ”to be taught by a kind of yet more G.o.dlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering (_patiens_) them.” But the sensitive appet.i.te cannot ”suffer”
Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore pa.s.sion is in the intellectual appet.i.te, just as it is also in the sensitive appet.i.te.
Obj. 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the pa.s.sion. But the object of the intellectual appet.i.te, which is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appet.i.te, which is a particular good. Therefore pa.s.sion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appet.i.te.
Obj. 3: Further, joy and love are said to be pa.s.sions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive appet.i.te: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to G.o.d and the angels. Therefore the pa.s.sions are not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appet.i.te.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal pa.s.sions: ”Pa.s.sion is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te when we imagine good or evil: in other words, pa.s.sion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) pa.s.sion is properly to be found where there is corporeal trans.m.u.tation. This corporeal trans.m.u.tation is found in the act of the sensitive appet.i.te, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for corporeal trans.m.u.tation in the act of the intellectual appet.i.te: because this appet.i.te is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that pa.s.sion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appet.i.te, than in that of the intellectual appet.i.te; and this is again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.
Reply Obj. 1: By ”suffering” Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place without any alteration in the body.
Reply Obj. 2: Intensity of pa.s.sion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the pa.s.sibility of the patient: because things that are disposed to pa.s.sion, suffer much even from petty agents.
Therefore although the object of the intellectual appet.i.te has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appet.i.te, yet the sensitive appet.i.te is more pa.s.sive.
Reply Obj. 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to G.o.d or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appet.i.te, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without pa.s.sion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): ”The holy angels feel no anger while they punish ... no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these pa.s.sions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours.”
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QUESTION 23
HOW THE Pa.s.sIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (In Four Articles)
We must now consider how the pa.s.sions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?
(2) Whether the contrariety of pa.s.sions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?
(3) Whether there is any pa.s.sion that has no contrary?
(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any pa.s.sions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?
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QUESTION 23
Whether the Pa.s.sions of the Concupiscible Part Are Different from Those of the Irascible Part?
Objection 1: It would seem that the same pa.s.sions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ii, 5) that the pa.s.sions of the soul are those emotions ”which are followed by joy or sorrow.” But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore all the pa.s.sions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Obj. 2: Further, on the words of Matt. 13:33, ”The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven,” etc., Jerome's gloss says: ”We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part.” But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in _Topic._ ii, 7. Therefore the same pa.s.sion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Obj. 3: Further, pa.s.sions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible pa.s.sions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same pa.s.sions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
_On the contrary,_ The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appet.i.te is divided, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore, since the pa.s.sions are movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3), the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
_I answer that,_ The pa.s.sions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have different objects, as stated in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 3), the pa.s.sions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the pa.s.sions of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species of pa.s.sions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and pa.s.sions regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which pa.s.sions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers. For we have stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2), that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever pa.s.sions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those pa.s.sions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2), the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible pa.s.sions terminate in the concupiscible pa.s.sions: and thus it is that even the pa.s.sions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.