Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 40 (1/2)
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty.
Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appet.i.te's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a pa.s.sion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that ”calm is contrary to anger,” by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
________________________
FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]
Whether in the Same Power, There Are Any Pa.s.sions, Specifically Different, but Not Contrary to One Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different pa.s.sions that are not contrary to one another.
For the pa.s.sions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's pa.s.sions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the pa.s.sions. Therefore no pa.s.sions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.
Obj. 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form.
But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 8. Therefore pa.s.sions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, since every pa.s.sion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in the pa.s.sions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the pa.s.sions of the soul, as stated above (A. 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's pa.s.sions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for pa.s.sions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
_On the contrary,_ Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are pa.s.sions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.
_I answer that,_ Pa.s.sions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the pa.s.sions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the pa.s.sions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fas.h.i.+on, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or apt.i.tude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or apt.i.tude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appet.i.tive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appet.i.tive power, a certain inclination, apt.i.tude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the pa.s.sion of _love:_ the corresponding contrary of which is _hatred_ in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appet.i.te a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the pa.s.sion of _desire_ or _concupiscence:_ and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the pa.s.sion of _aversion_ or _dislike._ Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appet.i.te to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the pa.s.sion of _delight_ or _joy;_ the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is _sorrow_ or _sadness._
On the other hand, in the irascible pa.s.sions, the apt.i.tude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.
And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have _hope_ and _despair._ In respect of evil not yet present we have _fear_ and _daring._ But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible pa.s.sion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above (A. 3). But evil already present gives rise to the pa.s.sion of _anger._
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of pa.s.sions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has no contrary pa.s.sion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven pa.s.sions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the pa.s.sions of the soul are contained.
From this the replies to the objections are evident.
________________________
QUESTION 24
OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE Pa.s.sIONS OF THE SOUL (In Four Articles)
We must now consider good and evil in the pa.s.sions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the pa.s.sions of the soul?
(2) Whether every pa.s.sion of the soul is morally evil?
(3) Whether every pa.s.sion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
(4) Whether any pa.s.sion is good or evil specifically?
________________________