Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 42 (2/2)
_On the contrary,_ Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, says:
”Banish joys: banish fears: Away with hope: away with tears.”
_I answer that,_ These four are commonly called the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be princ.i.p.al because in them all the other pa.s.sions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other pa.s.sions, as is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Fear and hope are princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appet.i.te towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four pa.s.sions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other pa.s.sions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, because they are general pa.s.sions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appet.i.te's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
Reply Obj. 2: These are called princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last pa.s.sions simply, yet they are the last of those pa.s.sions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, as we shall state further on (Reply Obj. 3).
Reply Obj. 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be princ.i.p.al. And so neither can anger be called a princ.i.p.al pa.s.sion, because it arises from daring.
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QUESTION 26
OF THE Pa.s.sIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (In Four Articles)
We have now to consider the soul's pa.s.sions in particular, and (1) the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty.
The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.
Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
(2) Whether love is a pa.s.sion?
(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?
(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friends.h.i.+p, and love of concupiscence?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]
Whether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): ”Her,” namely wisdom, ”have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth.” But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appet.i.te, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.
Obj. 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every pa.s.sion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): ”Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness.” But not every pa.s.sion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this pa.s.sage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.
Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a ”natural love.”
But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that ”love is in the concupiscible power.”
_I answer that,_ Love is something pertaining to the appet.i.te; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appet.i.tes. For there is an appet.i.te which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appet.i.te, but in some other: and this is called the _natural appet.i.te._ Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 1, 3). And there is another appet.i.te arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appet.i.te, but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the _sensitive appet.i.te,_ which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appet.i.te following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appet.i.te. And this is the rational or intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the _will._
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