Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 43 (1/2)

Now in each of these appet.i.tes, the name ”love” is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appet.i.te the principle of this movement is the appet.i.tive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called ”natural love”: thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called ”natural love.”

In like manner the apt.i.tude of the sensitive appet.i.te or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called ”sensitive love,” or ”intellectual” or ”rational love.” So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appet.i.te, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appet.i.te. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.

Reply Obj. 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), ”Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things”; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether Love Is a Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a pa.s.sion. For no power is a pa.s.sion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv). Therefore love is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a pa.s.sion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that pa.s.sion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appet.i.te; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.

Therefore love is not a pa.s.sion.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that ”love is a pa.s.sion.”

_I answer that,_ Pa.s.sion is the effect of the agent on the patient.

Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called ”natural love.” In the same way the appetible object gives the appet.i.te, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For ”the appet.i.tive movement is circular,” as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appet.i.te, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appet.i.te moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appet.i.te by the appetible object is called ”love,” and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is ”desire”; and lastly, there is rest which is ”joy.”

Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appet.i.te by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a pa.s.sion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.

Reply Obj. 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appet.i.te, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that ”love is a unitive force” (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.

Reply Obj. 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the appet.i.te in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the appet.i.te is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]

Whether Love Is the Same As Dilection?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, ”as four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines.” But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection denote the same thing.

Obj. 2: Further, the movements of the appet.i.te differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same.

Therefore these are the same.

Obj. 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that ”dilection refers to good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained,” according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that ”it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection.”

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that ”some holy men have held that love means something more G.o.dlike than dilection does.”

_I answer that,_ We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friends.h.i.+p. They differ, however, in this, that ”friends.h.i.+p,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), ”is like a habit,” whereas ”love” and ”dilection”