Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 43 (2/2)

are expressed by way of act or pa.s.sion; and ”charity” can be taken either way.

Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice (_electionem_) made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin ”carus” (dear)].

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appet.i.te; for thus love is the same as dilection.

Reply Obj. 2: The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the pa.s.sage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that ”a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love.” However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible pa.s.sion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some a.s.signed the difference spoken of.

Reply Obj. 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word ”love” signifies something more G.o.dlike than ”dilection,” was because love denotes a pa.s.sion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appet.i.te; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to G.o.d by love, being as it were pa.s.sively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more G.o.dlike than dilection.

________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]

Whether Love Is Properly Divided into Love of Friends.h.i.+p and Love of Concupiscence?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friends.h.i.+p and love of concupiscence. For ”love is a pa.s.sion, while friends.h.i.+p is a habit,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic.

viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of pa.s.sions.

Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friends.h.i.+p.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as ”animal.” But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a pa.s.sion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friends.h.i.+p is threefold, that which is founded on _usefulness,_ that which is founded on _pleasure,_ and that which is founded on _goodness._ But useful and pleasant friends.h.i.+p are not without concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friends.h.i.+p.

_On the contrary,_ We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus ”a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness which he desires”; as stated in _Topic._ ii, 3. But we have no friends.h.i.+p for wine and suchlike things, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friends.h.i.+p.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), ”to love is to wish good to someone.” Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good.

Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friends.h.i.+p towards him to whom he wishes good.

Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friends.h.i.+p is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.

Reply Obj. 1: Love is not divided into friends.h.i.+p and concupiscence, but into love of friends.h.i.+p, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: When friends.h.i.+p is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friends.h.i.+p is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friends.h.i.+p of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friends.h.i.+p.

________________________

QUESTION 27

OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?

(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?

(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?

<script>