Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 66 (1/2)

Whether Fear Is a Pa.s.sion of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that ”fear is a power, by way of _systole_”--i.e. of contraction--”desirous of vindicating nature.” But no virtue is a pa.s.sion, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 5.

Therefore fear is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, every pa.s.sion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, every pa.s.sion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.

But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

_I answer that,_ Among the other pa.s.sions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of pa.s.sion. For as we have stated above (Q. 22), the notion of pa.s.sion implies first of all a movement of a pa.s.sive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since pa.s.sion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both _to feel_ and _to understand_ are pa.s.sions. Secondly, more properly speaking, pa.s.sion is a movement of the appet.i.tive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appet.i.tive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily trans.m.u.tation. And, again, most properly those movements are called pa.s.sions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appet.i.tive power, which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appet.i.te: for it is accompanied by a certain trans.m.u.tation--i.e. contraction--as Damascene says (Cf. Obj. 1).

Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of pa.s.sion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appet.i.tive faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that pa.s.sion is a virtue by way of habit.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the pa.s.sion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the pa.s.sion of the soul due to the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is a Special Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special pa.s.sion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that ”the man who is not distraught by fear, is neither hara.s.sed by desire, nor wounded by sickness”--i.e. sorrow--”nor tossed about in transports of empty joys.” Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other pa.s.sions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that ”pursuit and avoidance in the appet.i.te are what affirmation and denial are in the intellect.” But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appet.i.te. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, if fear were a special pa.s.sion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that ”fear is a kind of sorrow”; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is ”a power of desire”: and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a special pa.s.sion, since it belongs to different powers.

_On the contrary,_ Fear is condivided with the other pa.s.sions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12, 15).

_I answer that,_ The pa.s.sions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special pa.s.sion, which has a special object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.

Consequently fear is a special pa.s.sion of the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: All the pa.s.sions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other pa.s.sions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every avoidance in the appet.i.te is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible pa.s.sions arise from the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises ”from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful.” In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 29, A. 2; Q. 36, A. 2).

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 3]

Whether There Is a Natural Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that ”there is a natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from the body.”

Obj. 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1).