Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 66 (2/2)

But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Therefore there is also a natural fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A.

4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom.

4:18, where it is said of Abraham that ”against hope” of nature, ”he believed in hope” of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.

_On the contrary,_ That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear.

_I answer that,_ A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.

Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1), the movements of the cognitive and appet.i.tive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal appet.i.te, are sometimes said to be natural.

And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of ”corruptive evil,” which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural.

Again, there is a fear of ”painful evil,” which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appet.i.te; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we have stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 30, A.

3; Q. 31, A. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.

But in the first sense of the word ”natural,” we must observe that certain pa.s.sions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural.

The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appet.i.te also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other pa.s.sions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these pa.s.sions (thus we have said, Q. 31, AA. 1, 3; Q. 35, A. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like pa.s.sions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.

Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 4]

Whether the Species of Fear Are Suitably a.s.signed?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably a.s.signed by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, ”laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety.” Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), ”fear regards a saddening evil.”

Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpa.s.ses our power, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).

But ”shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,” as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear.

Obj. 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear.

Obj. 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of _Metaph._ But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. Obj. 1, 3).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fear regards a future evil which surpa.s.ses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises _laziness,_ as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is _shamefacedness_; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is _shame._

On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpa.s.s man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is _amazement._ Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is _stupor,_ which is caused by the representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called _anxiety._

Reply Obj. 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself.

Reply Obj. 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed, and surpa.s.sing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.

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