Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 91 (2/2)

Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: ”If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: ”The sorrow that is according to G.o.d worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other pa.s.sions are when moderated by reason.

Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appet.i.te follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appet.i.te be conformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6, 7).

Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.

Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

Reply Obj. 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]

Whether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Pa.s.sions?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the pa.s.sions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that ”moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow.” But pleasure and sorrow are pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, AA. 1, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the pa.s.sions.

Obj. 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by partic.i.p.ation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the pa.s.sions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the pa.s.sions.

Obj. 3: Further, some pa.s.sion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the pa.s.sions, or none are. But some are about the pa.s.sions, as fort.i.tude and temperance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 6, 10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the pa.s.sions.

_On the contrary,_ Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the pa.s.sions; as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, seqq.

_I answer that,_ Moral virtue perfects the appet.i.tive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason.

Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the pa.s.sions of the sensitive appet.i.te, but also the operations of the intellective appet.i.te, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a pa.s.sion, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about pa.s.sions, but some are about pa.s.sions, some about operations.

Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, ”if virtues are about actions and pa.s.sions; now every action and pa.s.sion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,”

viz. as about something that results from virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: Not only the sensitive appet.i.te which is the subject of the pa.s.sions, is rational by partic.i.p.ation, but also the will, where there are no pa.s.sions, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues have pa.s.sions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 5]

Whether There Can Be Moral Virtue Without Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without pa.s.sion.

For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the pa.s.sions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the pa.s.sions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they are called ”pa.s.sions of sins.” Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to G.o.d, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But G.o.d does all things without pa.s.sion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any pa.s.sion.

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