Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 92 (1/2)

_On the contrary,_ ”No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds,” as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. But joy is a pa.s.sion. Therefore justice cannot be without pa.s.sion; and still less can the other virtues be.

_I answer that,_ If we take the pa.s.sions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the pa.s.sions. But if by pa.s.sions we understand any movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the pa.s.sions as about their proper matter, cannot be without pa.s.sions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appet.i.te altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.

Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appet.i.te to its proper regulated movements.

Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the pa.s.sions, but about operations, can be without pa.s.sions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a pa.s.sion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a pa.s.sion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appet.i.te; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7; Q. 24, A. 3).

Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate pa.s.sion; it produces ordinate pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, pa.s.sion that leads to sin.

Reply Obj. 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appet.i.te in G.o.d and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in G.o.d and the angels is altogether without pa.s.sion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with pa.s.sion, even as it is produced with the body's help.

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QUESTION 60

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?

(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about pa.s.sions?

(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?

(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions?

(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the pa.s.sions?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue.

Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appet.i.te which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

Obj. 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.

_On the contrary,_ One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appet.i.tive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2; Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 1, 2, 3), the moral virtues are habits of the appet.i.tive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2). Again, the species of the object of appet.i.te, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the pa.s.sive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appet.i.tive power is commanded and moved. But the appet.i.te does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by partic.i.p.ation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appet.i.tive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.

Reply Obj. 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.